Revision: 22890 http://trac.macosforge.org/projects/launchd/changeset/22890 Author: zarzycki@apple.com Date: 2006-10-12 12:13:23 -0700 (Thu, 12 Oct 2006) Log Message: ----------- Make the remote creds accessible at any time. Modified Paths: -------------- trunk/launchd/src/launchd_core_logic.c trunk/launchd/src/launchd_runtime.c trunk/launchd/src/launchd_runtime.h trunk/launchd/src/protocol_legacy.defs Modified: trunk/launchd/src/launchd_core_logic.c =================================================================== --- trunk/launchd/src/launchd_core_logic.c 2006-10-11 00:09:19 UTC (rev 22889) +++ trunk/launchd/src/launchd_core_logic.c 2006-10-12 19:13:23 UTC (rev 22890) @@ -88,16 +88,6 @@ static au_asid_t inherited_asid; mach_port_t inherited_bootstrap_port; -struct ldcred { - uid_t euid; - uid_t uid; - gid_t egid; - gid_t gid; - pid_t pid; - au_asid_t asid; -}; - -static void audit_token_to_launchd_cred(audit_token_t au_tok, struct ldcred *ldc); static bool trusted_client_check(job_t j, struct ldcred *ldc); @@ -3473,13 +3463,12 @@ } kern_return_t -job_mig_create_server(job_t j, cmd_t server_cmd, uid_t server_uid, boolean_t on_demand, - audit_token_t au_tok, mach_port_t *server_portp) +job_mig_create_server(job_t j, cmd_t server_cmd, uid_t server_uid, boolean_t on_demand, mach_port_t *server_portp) { struct ldcred ldc; job_t js; - audit_token_to_launchd_cred(au_tok, &ldc); + runtime_get_caller_creds(&ldc); job_log(j, LOG_DEBUG, "Server create attempt: %s", server_cmd); @@ -3527,12 +3516,12 @@ } kern_return_t -job_mig_get_self(job_t j, audit_token_t au_tok, mach_port_t *unprivportp) +job_mig_get_self(job_t j, mach_port_t *unprivportp) { struct ldcred ldc; job_t j2; - audit_token_to_launchd_cred(au_tok, &ldc); + runtime_get_caller_creds(&ldc); job_log(j, LOG_DEBUG, "Requested unprivileged bootstrap port"); @@ -3557,13 +3546,13 @@ kern_return_t -job_mig_check_in(job_t j, name_t servicename, audit_token_t au_tok, mach_port_t *serviceportp) +job_mig_check_in(job_t j, name_t servicename, mach_port_t *serviceportp) { static pid_t last_warned_pid = 0; struct machservice *ms; struct ldcred ldc; - audit_token_to_launchd_cred(au_tok, &ldc); + runtime_get_caller_creds(&ldc); ms = job_lookup_service(j, servicename, true); @@ -3593,13 +3582,13 @@ } kern_return_t -job_mig_register(job_t j, audit_token_t au_tok, name_t servicename, mach_port_t serviceport) +job_mig_register(job_t j, name_t servicename, mach_port_t serviceport) { struct machservice *ms; struct ldcred ldc; job_t j2; - audit_token_to_launchd_cred(au_tok, &ldc); + runtime_get_caller_creds(&ldc); if (j == job_get_bs(j)) { j2 = job_find_by_pid(j, ldc.pid, false); @@ -3641,12 +3630,12 @@ } kern_return_t -job_mig_look_up(job_t j, audit_token_t au_tok, name_t servicename, mach_port_t *serviceportp, mach_msg_type_name_t *ptype) +job_mig_look_up(job_t j, name_t servicename, mach_port_t *serviceportp, mach_msg_type_name_t *ptype) { struct machservice *ms; struct ldcred ldc; - audit_token_to_launchd_cred(au_tok, &ldc); + runtime_get_caller_creds(&ldc); ms = job_lookup_service(j, servicename, true); @@ -3896,17 +3885,17 @@ } kern_return_t -job_mig_wait(job_t j, mach_port_t srp, audit_token_t au_tok, integer_t *waitstatus) +job_mig_wait(job_t j, mach_port_t srp, integer_t *waitstatus) { #if 0 struct ldcred ldc; - audit_token_to_launchd_cred(au_tok, &ldc); + runtime_get_caller_creds(&ldc); #endif return job_handle_mpm_wait(j, srp, waitstatus); } kern_return_t -job_mig_uncork_fork(job_t j, audit_token_t au_tok) +job_mig_uncork_fork(job_t j) { if (!j) { return BOOTSTRAP_NOT_PRIVILEGED; @@ -3918,8 +3907,7 @@ } kern_return_t -job_mig_spawn(job_t j, audit_token_t au_tok, - _internal_string_t charbuf, mach_msg_type_number_t charbuf_cnt, +job_mig_spawn(job_t j, _internal_string_t charbuf, mach_msg_type_number_t charbuf_cnt, uint32_t argc, uint32_t envc, uint64_t flags, uint16_t mig_umask, pid_t *child_pid, mach_port_t *obsvr_port) { @@ -3933,7 +3921,7 @@ const char *workingdir = NULL; size_t argv_i = 0, env_i = 0; - audit_token_to_launchd_cred(au_tok, &ldc); + runtime_get_caller_creds(&ldc); #if 0 if (ldc.asid != inherited_asid) { @@ -3993,14 +3981,6 @@ return BOOTSTRAP_SUCCESS; } -void -audit_token_to_launchd_cred(audit_token_t au_tok, struct ldcred *ldc) -{ - audit_token_to_au32(au_tok, /* audit UID */ NULL, &ldc->euid, - &ldc->egid, &ldc->uid, &ldc->gid, &ldc->pid, - &ldc->asid, /* au_tid_t */ NULL); -} - bool trusted_client_check(job_t j, struct ldcred *ldc) { Modified: trunk/launchd/src/launchd_runtime.c =================================================================== --- trunk/launchd/src/launchd_runtime.c 2006-10-11 00:09:19 UTC (rev 22889) +++ trunk/launchd/src/launchd_runtime.c 2006-10-12 19:13:23 UTC (rev 22890) @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static size_t mig_cb_table_sz; static timeout_callback runtime_idle_callback; static mach_msg_timeout_t runtime_idle_timeout; +static audit_token_t *au_tok; void launchd_runtime_init(void) @@ -475,6 +476,38 @@ return KERN_SUCCESS; } +static void +record_caller_creds(mach_msg_header_t *mh) +{ + mach_msg_max_trailer_t *tp; + size_t trailer_size; + + tp = (mach_msg_max_trailer_t *)((vm_offset_t)mh + round_msg(mh->msgh_size)); + + trailer_size = tp->msgh_trailer_size - (mach_msg_size_t)(sizeof(mach_msg_trailer_type_t) - sizeof(mach_msg_trailer_size_t)); + + if (trailer_size < (mach_msg_size_t)sizeof(audit_token_t)) { + au_tok = NULL; + return; + } + + au_tok = &tp->msgh_audit; +} + +bool +runtime_get_caller_creds(struct ldcred *ldc) +{ + if (!au_tok) { + return false; + } + + audit_token_to_au32(*au_tok, /* audit UID */ NULL, &ldc->euid, + &ldc->egid, &ldc->uid, &ldc->gid, &ldc->pid, + &ldc->asid, /* au_tid_t */ NULL); + + return true; +} + void launchd_runtime2(mach_msg_size_t msg_size, mig_reply_error_t *bufRequest, mig_reply_error_t *bufReply) { @@ -555,6 +588,8 @@ break; } + record_caller_creds(&bufRequest->Head); + if (the_demux(&bufRequest->Head, &bufReply->Head) == FALSE) { /* XXX - also gross */ if (bufRequest->Head.msgh_id == MACH_NOTIFY_NO_SENDERS) { Modified: trunk/launchd/src/launchd_runtime.h =================================================================== --- trunk/launchd/src/launchd_runtime.h 2006-10-11 00:09:19 UTC (rev 22889) +++ trunk/launchd/src/launchd_runtime.h 2006-10-12 19:13:23 UTC (rev 22890) @@ -22,6 +22,15 @@ #include <mach/mach.h> +struct ldcred { + uid_t euid; + uid_t uid; + gid_t egid; + gid_t gid; + pid_t pid; + au_asid_t asid; +}; + /* * Use launchd_assumes() when we can recover, even if it means we leak or limp along. * @@ -50,7 +59,9 @@ void runtime_set_timeout(timeout_callback to_cb, mach_msg_timeout_t to); kern_return_t runtime_add_mport(mach_port_t name, mig_callback demux, mach_msg_size_t msg_size); kern_return_t runtime_remove_mport(mach_port_t name); +bool runtime_get_caller_creds(struct ldcred *ldc); + int kevent_mod(uintptr_t ident, short filter, u_short flags, u_int fflags, intptr_t data, void *udata); kern_return_t launchd_set_bport(mach_port_t name); Modified: trunk/launchd/src/protocol_legacy.defs =================================================================== --- trunk/launchd/src/protocol_legacy.defs 2006-10-11 00:09:19 UTC (rev 22889) +++ trunk/launchd/src/protocol_legacy.defs 2006-10-12 19:13:23 UTC (rev 22890) @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ __server_cmd : cmd_t; __server_uid : natural_t; __on_demand : boolean_t; - ServerAuditToken __token : audit_token_t; out __server_port : mach_port_make_send_t); skip; /* Last used in 10.4. Was bootstrap_unprivileged() */ @@ -47,18 +46,15 @@ routine check_in( __bs_port : job_t; __service_name : name_t; - ServerAuditToken __token : audit_token_t; out __service_port : mach_port_move_receive_t); routine register( __bs_port : job_t; - ServerAuditToken __token : audit_token_t; __service_name : name_t; __service_port : mach_port_t); routine look_up( __bs_port : job_t; - ServerAuditToken __token : audit_token_t; __service_name : name_t; out __service_port : mach_port_send_t); @@ -99,7 +95,6 @@ routine spawn( __bs_port : job_t; - ServerAuditToken __token : audit_token_t; __chars : _internal_string_t; __argc : uint32_t; __envc : uint32_t; @@ -111,15 +106,12 @@ routine wait( __bs_port : job_t; sreplyport __rport : mach_port_make_send_once_t; - ServerAuditToken __token : audit_token_t; out __waitval : integer_t); routine uncork_fork( - __bs_port : job_t; - ServerAuditToken __token : audit_token_t); + __bs_port : job_t); /* Essentially the inverse of bootstrap_unprivileged() */ routine get_self( __bs_port : job_t; - ServerAuditToken __token : audit_token_t; out __job_port : mach_port_make_send_t);