Forwarding to macports developers. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: js <ebgssth@gmail.com> Date: Dec 25, 2007 12:19 AM Subject: macforge.org via https? To: MacPorts Users <macports-users@lists.macosforge.org> Hi list, A simple question. is there any reason http://www.macosforge.org/wp-login.php is not HTTPS?
On Dec 25, 2007, at 8:51 AM, js wrote:
Forwarding to macports developers.
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: js <ebgssth@gmail.com> Date: Dec 25, 2007 12:19 AM Subject: macforge.org via https? To: MacPorts Users <macports-users@lists.macosforge.org>
Hi list,
A simple question.
is there any reason http://www.macosforge.org/wp-login.php is not HTTPS?
Because we use http digest for authentication, not SSL. -jmpp
On Dec 25, 2007, at 8:44 AM, Juan Manuel Palacios wrote:
On Dec 25, 2007, at 8:51 AM, js wrote:
Forwarding to macports developers.
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: js <ebgssth@gmail.com> Date: Dec 25, 2007 12:19 AM Subject: macforge.org via https? To: MacPorts Users <macports-users@lists.macosforge.org>
Hi list,
A simple question.
is there any reason http://www.macosforge.org/wp-login.php is not HTTPS?
Because we use http digest for authentication, not SSL.
But HTTP digest doesn't solve any of the problems that SSL solves: - It is still vulnerable to a MITM attack. Your password is hashed, but the hash is password-equivalent -- an attacker can simply forward it on. - Digest authentication is indistinguishable from Basic authentication -- your browser will display the same dialog regardless of the authentication type. At best, it will prevent a passive attacker from acquiring your password. Anyone engaging in an active MITM attack will have no difficultly acquiring your password. -landonf
We (at Mac OS Forge) are working on an improved infrastructure that will remove the need for digest auth, use SSL, etc. I dont have an ETA for you, but rest assured we know we have plenty of improvements to make site-wide. Thanks. -Bill On Dec 31, 2007, at 3:26 PM, Landon Fuller wrote:
On Dec 25, 2007, at 8:44 AM, Juan Manuel Palacios wrote:
On Dec 25, 2007, at 8:51 AM, js wrote:
Forwarding to macports developers.
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: js <ebgssth@gmail.com> Date: Dec 25, 2007 12:19 AM Subject: macforge.org via https? To: MacPorts Users <macports-users@lists.macosforge.org>
Hi list,
A simple question.
is there any reason http://www.macosforge.org/wp-login.php is not HTTPS?
Because we use http digest for authentication, not SSL.
But HTTP digest doesn't solve any of the problems that SSL solves: - It is still vulnerable to a MITM attack. Your password is hashed, but the hash is password-equivalent -- an attacker can simply forward it on. - Digest authentication is indistinguishable from Basic authentication -- your browser will display the same dialog regardless of the authentication type.
At best, it will prevent a passive attacker from acquiring your password. Anyone engaging in an active MITM attack will have no difficultly acquiring your password.
-landonf _______________________________________________ macports-dev mailing list macports-dev@lists.macosforge.org http://lists.macosforge.org/mailman/listinfo/macports-dev
---- William Siegrist Software Support Engineer Mac OS Forge http://macosforge.org/ wsiegrist@apple.com 408 862 7337
On Dec 31, 2007, at 3:26 PM, Landon Fuller wrote:
But HTTP digest doesn't solve any of the problems that SSL solves: - It is still vulnerable to a MITM attack. Your password is hashed, but the hash is password-equivalent -- an attacker can simply forward it on.
Not really... the server sends a random nonce-value, and the client must include that in the hashed-response. Replay is not an issue. response = MD5(MD5(username : realm : password), nonce, MD5(method : uri)) http://rfc.net/rfc2069.html
- Digest authentication is indistinguishable from Basic authentication -- your browser will display the same dialog regardless of the authentication type.
Safari distinguishes them; Basic authentication dialogs say the password will be sent in the clear.
At best, it will prevent a passive attacker from acquiring your password. Anyone engaging in an active MITM attack will have no difficultly acquiring your password.
I agree SSL provides additional security benefits, but digest authentication isn't as transparent as you indicate. - Kevin
On Jan 2, 2008, at 10:40, Kevin Van Vechten wrote:
On Dec 31, 2007, at 3:26 PM, Landon Fuller wrote:
But HTTP digest doesn't solve any of the problems that SSL solves: - It is still vulnerable to a MITM attack. Your password is hashed, but the hash is password-equivalent -- an attacker can simply forward it on.
Not really... the server sends a random nonce-value, and the client must include that in the hashed-response. Replay is not an issue.
response = MD5(MD5(username : realm : password), nonce, MD5 (method : uri))
Replay isn't an issue, but that doesn't stop a MITM attack -- the password-equivalent value is usable once. Attack scenario: Client requests a page that requires authentication. MITM returns 301 redirect to the client. The redirect points to a URL the MITM wishes to access. Client automatically follows redirect. MITM passes the 401 Unauthorized response through, client authenticates using HTTP digest. MITM has now successfully directed the client to a resource of its choice, and acquired a single-use token. Can even be used to form POST, via a crafted HTML page. Nil chance of this happening at your home or internet cafe, but what about a targeted attack at a technical conference? Given the wide use and distribution of MacPorts, there is significant value in acquiring project access.
- Digest authentication is indistinguishable from Basic authentication -- your browser will display the same dialog regardless of the authentication type.
Safari distinguishes them; Basic authentication dialogs say the password will be sent in the clear.
Currently, trying to access http://www.macosforge.org/wp-login.php in Safari says the following: "Your password will be sent in the clear." I don't have digest auth set up anywhere, so I can't test digest vs. non-digest in Safari. Firefox doesn't show any difference in the auth dialog -- I'd easily login using the basic auth. Also, does Safari refuse to auto-login if the authentication type changes?
At best, it will prevent a passive attacker from acquiring your password. Anyone engaging in an active MITM attack will have no difficultly acquiring your password.
I agree SSL provides additional security benefits, but digest authentication isn't as transparent as you indicate.
I still hold that it is -- digest auth makes passive sniffing useless, but it doesn't prevent an active attack from acquiring your password, especially if you're using a browser that fails to differentiate between digest and basic auth. -landonf
On Jan 2, 2008, at 12:37 PM, Landon Fuller wrote:
- Digest authentication is indistinguishable from Basic authentication -- your browser will display the same dialog regardless of the authentication type.
Safari distinguishes them; Basic authentication dialogs say the password will be sent in the clear.
Currently, trying to access http://www.macosforge.org/wp-login.php in Safari says the following: "Your password will be sent in the clear."
Oh right, ironically Safari has a bug in that message is displayed even for digest authentication (it is not intended to be).
Firefox doesn't show any difference in the auth dialog -- I'd easily login using the basic auth. Also, does Safari refuse to auto-login if the authentication type changes?
Unknown. The RFC suggests that it should. =)
At best, it will prevent a passive attacker from acquiring your password. Anyone engaging in an active MITM attack will have no difficultly acquiring your password.
I agree SSL provides additional security benefits, but digest authentication isn't as transparent as you indicate.
I still hold that it is -- digest auth makes passive sniffing useless, but it doesn't prevent an active attack from acquiring your password, especially if you're using a browser that fails to differentiate between digest and basic auth.
We're probably talking past each other, and I'm probably splitting hairs. I disagree that the MITM can "acquire your password" but I agree that a MITM could "masquerade as you." - Kevin
On Jan 2, 2008, at 12:45 PM, Kevin Van Vechten wrote:
We're probably talking past each other, and I'm probably splitting hairs. I disagree that the MITM can "acquire your password" but I agree that a MITM could "masquerade as you."
Well from a protocol perspective anyway; I guess we've established no clients are well-behaved. sigh. - Kevin
participants (5)
-
js
-
Juan Manuel Palacios
-
Kevin Van Vechten
-
Landon Fuller
-
William Siegrist