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<title>[129549] trunk/dports/net/openssh</title>
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<dl class="meta">
<dt>Revision</dt> <dd><a href="https://trac.macports.org/changeset/129549">129549</a></dd>
<dt>Author</dt> <dd>ionic@macports.org</dd>
<dt>Date</dt> <dd>2014-12-15 07:16:10 -0800 (Mon, 15 Dec 2014)</dd>
</dl>
<h3>Log Message</h3>
<pre>openssh: pull in 6.7-compatible gsskex patch.</pre>
<h3>Modified Paths</h3>
<ul>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshPortfile">trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile</a></li>
</ul>
<h3>Added Paths</h3>
<ul>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh67p1gsskexall20140907patch">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch</a></li>
</ul>
<h3>Removed Paths</h3>
<ul>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh63p1gsskexall20130920patch">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div id="patch">
<h3>Diff</h3>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshPortfile"></a>
<div class="modfile"><h4>Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile (129548 => 129549)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile        2014-12-15 15:16:00 UTC (rev 129548)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile        2014-12-15 15:16:10 UTC (rev 129549)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> variant gsskex conflicts hpn requires kerberos5 description "Add OpenSSH GSSAPI key exchange patch" {
</span><span class="cx"> use_autoreconf yes
</span><span class="cx"> patchfiles-append 0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch \
</span><del>- openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch
</del><ins>+ openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch
</ins><span class="cx"> configure.cppflags-append \
</span><span class="cx"> -F/System/Library/Frameworks/DirectoryService.framework \
</span><span class="cx"> -F/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework \
</span></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh63p1gsskexall20130920patch"></a>
<div class="delfile"><h4>Deleted: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch (129548 => 129549)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch        2014-12-15 15:16:00 UTC (rev 129548)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch        2014-12-15 15:16:10 UTC (rev 129549)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1,2939 +0,0 @@
</span><del>-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/ChangeLog.gssapi openssh-6.5p1.patched/ChangeLog.gssapi
---- openssh-6.5p1/ChangeLog.gssapi        1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/ChangeLog.gssapi        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+20110101
-+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
-+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
-+
-+20100308
-+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
-+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
-+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
-+ Watson.
-+ -
-+
-+20100124
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
-+ Colin Watson
-+
-+20090615
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
-+ sshd.c ]
-+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
-+        Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
-+        Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
-+        Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
-+        Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
-+        Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
-+        Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
-+        Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
-+        Cast data.length before printing
-+        If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
-+
-+20090201
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
-+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
-+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
-+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
-+
-+20080404
-+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
-+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
-+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
-+ Stoichkov
-+
-+20070317
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
-+ function
-+
-+20061220
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
-+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
-+
-+20060910
-+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
-+ ssh-gss.h ]
-+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
-+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
-+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
-+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
-+ <Bugzilla #928>
-+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
-+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
-+ configuration files
-+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
-+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
-+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
-+
-+20060909
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
-+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
-+ only, where they belong
-+ <Bugzilla #1225>
-+
-+20060829
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
-+ variable
-+
-+20060828
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
-+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
-+
-+20060818
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
-+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
-+
-+20060421
-+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
-+ fix compiler errors/warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
-+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
-+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
-+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/Makefile.in openssh-6.5p1.patched/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.5p1/Makefile.in        2014-01-26 22:35:04.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/Makefile.in        2014-02-15 16:51:24.000000000 -0800
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o
-         atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
-         monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
-         kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
-+        kexgssc.o \
-         msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
-         ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
-         kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
-@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
-         auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
-         monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
-         kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
--        auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+        auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
-         loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
-         sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
-         roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/auth-krb5.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/auth-krb5.c        2013-10-23 16:53:02.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/auth-krb5.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
-
-         len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
-         authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+        snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
-+         authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
-         snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
-          authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-         if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -240,15 +245,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--        int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-+        int ret;
-         char ccname[40];
-         mode_t old_umask;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+        char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
-+        char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
-+        int tmpfd, oerrno;
-+#endif
-
-         ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
--         "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+         cctemplate, geteuid());
-         if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
-                 return ENOMEM;
-
-+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
-         old_umask = umask(0177);
-         tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
-         oerrno = errno;
-@@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_c
-                 return oerrno;
-         }
-         close(tmpfd);
-+#endif
-
-         return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/auth2-gss.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/auth2-gss.c        2013-06-01 14:31:18.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/auth2-gss.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u
- static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-+/*
-+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
-+ */
-+static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+        int authenticated = 0;
-+        Buffer b;
-+        gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+        u_int len;
-+
-+        mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-+        mic.length = len;
-+
-+        packet_check_eom();
-+
-+        ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+         "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+        gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+        /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+        if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+         &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+                authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+                 authctxt->pw));
-+        
-+        buffer_free(&b);
-+        free(mic.value);
-+
-+        return (authenticated);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -235,7 +269,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
-
-         packet_check_eom();
-
--        authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+        authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+         authctxt->pw));
-
-         authctxt->postponed = 0;
-         dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-@@ -270,7 +305,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
-         gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
-         if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
--                authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+                authenticated =
-+                 PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
-         else
-                 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
-@@ -285,6 +321,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
-         userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
- }
-
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+        "gssapi-keyex",
-+        userauth_gsskeyex,
-+        &options.gss_authentication
-+};
-+
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
-         "gssapi-with-mic",
-         userauth_gssapi,
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/auth2.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/auth2.c        2013-06-01 14:41:51.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/auth2.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
-
-@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
-         &method_none,
-         &method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+        &method_gsskeyex,
-         &method_gssapi,
- #endif
-         &method_passwd,
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/clientloop.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/clientloop.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/clientloop.c        2013-11-20 18:57:15.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/clientloop.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
- #include "msg.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
-
-@@ -1634,6 +1638,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha
-                 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
-                 if (!rekeying) {
-                         channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+                        if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
-+                         ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
-+                                debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
-+                                need_rekeying = 1;
-+                        }
-+#endif
-+
-                         if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
-                                 debug("need rekeying");
-                                 xxx_kex->done = 0;
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/configure.ac openssh-6.5p1.patched/configure.ac
---- openssh-6.5p1/configure.ac        2014-01-29 16:26:46.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/configure.ac        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -584,6 +584,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
-          [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
-         AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
-          [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
-+        AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
-+        AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
-+                [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
-+                [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
-+                 AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
-+                        [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
-+                 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+                 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-+                [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
-+                 AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
-+        AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
-+        AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-+                [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
-+                [cc_context_t c;
-+                 (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
-+                [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
-+                        [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
-+                 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+                 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-+                 if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
-+                        AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
-+                fi],
-+                [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
-+        )
-         m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
-         AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
-          AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/gss-genr.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/gss-genr.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/gss-genr.c        2013-11-07 17:19:57.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/gss-genr.c        2014-02-15 17:23:28.000000000 -0800
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.22 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-+typedef struct {
-+        char *encoded;
-+        gss_OID oid;
-+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
-+
-+/*
-+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
-+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
-+ */
-+
-+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
-+
-+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
-+        return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
-+ *
-+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
-+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
-+ */
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
-+        gss_OID_set gss_supported;
-+        OM_uint32 min_status;
-+
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
-+                return NULL;
-+
-+        return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-+         host, client));
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-+ const char *host, const char *client) {
-+        Buffer buf;
-+        size_t i;
-+        int oidpos, enclen;
-+        char *mechs, *encoded;
-+        u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+        char deroid[2];
-+        const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
-+        EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+
-+        if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
-+                for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-+                        free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
-+                free(gss_enc2oid);
-+        }
-+
-+        gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
-+         (gss_supported->count + 1));
-+
-+        buffer_init(&buf);
-+
-+        oidpos = 0;
-+        for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
-+                if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
-+                 (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
-+
-+                        deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
-+                        deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+                        EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-+                        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
-+                        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
-+                         gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+                         gss_supported->elements[i].length);
-+                        EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
-+
-+                        encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+                        enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
-+                         encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+
-+                        if (oidpos != 0)
-+                                buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+
-+                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+                         sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+                        buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+                         sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+                        buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+                         sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+
-+                        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
-+                        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
-+                        oidpos++;
-+                }
-+        }
-+        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
-+        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-+
-+        buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
-+
-+        mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
-+        buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
-+        buffer_free(&buf);
-+
-+        if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
-+                free(mechs);
-+                mechs = NULL;
-+        }
-+        
-+        return (mechs);
-+}
-+
-+gss_OID
-+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
-+        int i = 0;
-+        
-+        switch (kex_type) {
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
-+                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+                break;
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
-+                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+                break;
-+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
-+                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+                break;
-+        default:
-+                return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+        }
-+
-+        while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
-+         strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
-+                i++;
-+
-+        if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
-+                ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
-+
-+        return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
-+}
-+
- /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de
-         }
-
-         ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
--         GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
-+         ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
-          GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
-          0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
-
-@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con
- }
-
- OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
-+{
-+        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+        gss_name_t gssname;
-+        OM_uint32 status;
-+        gss_OID_set oidset;
-+
-+        gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
-+        gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
-+
-+        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+        gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+        ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
-+         GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
-+
-+        if (!ctx->major)
-+                ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+                 gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-+                 &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+        gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
-+        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+
-+        if (ctx->major)
-+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+
-+        return(ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- {
-+        if (ctx == NULL)
-+                return -1;
-+
-         if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-          GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
-                 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer
-         return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+/* Priviledged when used by server */
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+{
-+        if (ctx == NULL)
-+                return -1;
-+
-+        ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+         gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+
-+        return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
- void
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- const char *context)
-@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha
- }
-
- int
--ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
-+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
-+ const char *client)
- {
-         gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-         OM_uint32 major, minor;
-         gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-+        Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
-+
-+        if (ctx == NULL)
-+                ctx = &intctx;
-
-         /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
-         if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
-@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
-         ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
-         ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
-         major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
-+
-+        if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
-+                major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
-+
-         if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-                 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
-                  NULL);
-@@ -272,10 +483,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
-                          GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
-         }
-
--        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
-                 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-
-         return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
-+        static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+        static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
-+        static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+        static gss_name_t name;
-+        static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
-+        OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
-+        int equal;
-+
-+        now = time(NULL);
-+
-+        if (ctxt) {
-+                debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
-+
-+                if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
-+                        gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
-+
-+                major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+                 &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+                if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+                        saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
-+                 saved_lifetime+= now;
-+                } else {
-+                        /* Handle the error */
-+                }
-+                return 0;
-+        }
-+
-+        if (now - last_call < 10)
-+                return 0;
-+
-+        last_call = now;
-+
-+        if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+                return 0;
-+        
-+        major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+         &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+        if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
-+                return 0;
-+        else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+                return 0;
-+
-+        major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
-+        gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+                return 0;
-+
-+        if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
-+                return 1;
-+
-+        return 0;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/gss-serv-krb5.c        2014-01-19 18:18:09.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/gss-serv-krb5.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
-         OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-         int len;
-         const char *errmsg;
-+        const char *new_ccname;
-
-         if (client->creds == NULL) {
-                 debug("No credentials stored");
-@@ -180,11 +181,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
-                 return;
-         }
-
--        client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
-+        new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-+
-         client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
--        len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
--        client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
--        snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+        xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-+        client->store.filename = NULL;
-+#else
-+        xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
-+        client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-         if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -196,6 +202,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
-         return;
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+        krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+        krb5_principal principal = NULL;
-+        char *name = NULL;
-+        krb5_error_code problem;
-+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+         if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ return 0;
-+         }
-+        
-+        /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
-+        if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
-+         &principal))) {
-+                logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
-+                 krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+                return 0;
-+        }
-+
-+        if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
-+                logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
-+                 krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+                return 0;
-+        }
-+
-+
-+        if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
-+                debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
-+                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+                krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+                return 0;
-+        }
-+        krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+
-+        /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
-+
-+        if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
-+                logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
-+                 krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+                return 0;
-+        }
-+
-+        krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+
-+        if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
-+         ccache))) {
-+                logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
-+                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+                return 0;
-+        }
-+
-+        return 1;
-+}
-+
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
-         "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
-         "Kerberos",
-@@ -203,7 +274,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
-         NULL,
-         &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
-         NULL,
--        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
-+        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
-+        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
- };
-
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/gss-serv.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/gss-serv.c        2013-07-19 20:35:45.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/gss-serv.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
-
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -100,25 +105,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
-         char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-         gss_OID_set oidset;
-
--        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
--        gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+        if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
-+                gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+                gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+                if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-+                        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+                        return (-1);
-+                }
-
--        if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
--                gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
--                return (-1);
--        }
-+                if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-+                        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+                        return (ctx->major);
-+                }
-+
-+                if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+                 ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
-+                 NULL, NULL)))
-+                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
--        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-                 gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-                 return (ctx->major);
-+        } else {
-+                ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+                ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-         }
--
--        if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
--         ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
--                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
--
--        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
--        return (ctx->major);
-+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
-
- /* Privileged */
-@@ -133,6 +145,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss
- }
-
- /* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
-+        gss_OID_set        supported;
-+
-+        ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
-+        return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-+         NULL, NULL));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
-+ const char *dummy) {
-+        Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+        int res;
-+
-+        res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+        ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+        return (res);
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- {
-@@ -142,7 +177,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o
-         gss_OID_set supported;
-
-         gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
--        gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-+
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
-+                return;
-
-         while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
-                 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -268,8 +305,48 @@ OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
-         int i = 0;
-+        int equal = 0;
-+        gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+        gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+
-+        if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
-+                if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+                 (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+                 ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
-+                        debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
-+                        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+                }
-+
-+                if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+                 ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
-+                 NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+                        return (ctx->major);
-+                }
-+
-+                ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
-+                 new_name, &equal);
-
--        gss_buffer_desc ename;
-+                if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-+                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+                        return (ctx->major);
-+                }
-+
-+                if (!equal) {
-+                        debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
-+                        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+                }
-+
-+                debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
-+
-+                gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+                gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
-+                client->name = new_name;
-+                client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-+         ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+                client->updated = 1;
-+                return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+        }
-
-         client->mech = NULL;
-
-@@ -284,6 +361,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
-         if (client->mech == NULL)
-                 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
-+        if (ctx->client_creds &&
-+         (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+         ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+                return (ctx->major);
-+        }
-+
-         if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
-          &client->displayname, NULL))) {
-                 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -301,6 +385,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
-                 return (ctx->major);
-         }
-
-+        gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+
-         /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
-         client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-         ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -348,7 +434,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
-
- /* Privileged */
- int
--ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
-         OM_uint32 lmin;
-
-@@ -358,9 +444,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-                 return 0;
-         }
-         if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
--                if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
-+                if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
-+                        gssapi_client.used = 1;
-+                        gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
-                         return 1;
--                else {
-+                } else {
-                         /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
-                         gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
-                         gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -374,14 +462,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-         return (0);
- }
-
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
-+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
-+ *
-+ * In the child, we want to :
-+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
-+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
-+ */
-+
-+/* Stuff for PAM */
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
-+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
- {
--        ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
--         gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+        return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-+}
-+#endif
-
--        return (ctx->major);
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
-+        int ok;
-+        int ret;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+        pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+        struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
-+        char *envstr;
-+#endif
-+
-+        if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-+         gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+         gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+                return;
-+
-+        ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-+
-+        if (!ok)
-+                return;
-+
-+        debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
-+        /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
-+         * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
-+         * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
-+         */
-+#ifdef USE_PAM        
-+        if (!use_privsep) {
-+                debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+                return;
-+        }
-+
-+        ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
-+          &pamconv, &pamh);
-+        if (ret)
-+                return;
-+
-+        xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
-+         gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+        ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
-+        if (!ret)
-+                pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-+        pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
-+        int ok = 0;
-+
-+        /* Check we've got credentials to store */
-+        if (!gssapi_client.updated)
-+                return 0;
-+
-+        gssapi_client.updated = 0;
-+
-+        temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
-+        if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
-+                ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
-+        else
-+                debug("No update function for this mechanism");
-+
-+        restore_uid();
-+
-+        return ok;
- }
-
- #endif
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/kex.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/kex.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/kex.c        2014-01-25 14:38:04.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/kex.c        2014-02-15 17:24:33.000000000 -0800
-@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
- # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
- # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
-@@ -90,6 +94,11 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
- #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-         { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- #endif
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+        { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+        { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+#endif
-         { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
- };
-
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/kex.h openssh-6.5p1.patched/kex.h
---- openssh-6.5p1/kex.h        2014-01-25 14:37:26.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/kex.h        2014-02-15 16:52:30.000000000 -0800
-@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
-         KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
-         KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
-         KEX_C25519_SHA256,
-+        KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+        KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+        KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
-         KEX_MAX
- };
-
-@@ -135,6 +138,12 @@ struct Kex {
-         int        flags;
-         int        hash_alg;
-         int        ec_nid;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        int        gss_deleg_creds;
-+        int        gss_trust_dns;
-+        char *gss_host;
-+        char        *gss_client;
-+#endif
-         char        *client_version_string;
-         char        *server_version_string;
-         int        (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
-@@ -167,6 +176,11 @@ void         kexecdh_server(Kex *);
- void         kexc25519_client(Kex *);
- void         kexc25519_server(Kex *);
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+void        kexgss_client(Kex *);
-+void        kexgss_server(Kex *);
-+#endif
-+
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
- BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/kexgssc.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/kexgssc.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/kexgssc.c        1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/kexgssc.c        2014-02-15 17:17:35.000000000 -0800
-@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
-+        gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+        gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
-+        Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+        u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
-+        DH *dh;
-+        BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+        BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+        Buffer shared_secret_buffer;
-+        BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+        BIGNUM *g = NULL;        
-+        u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+        u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
-+        u_char *empty = "";
-+        char *msg;
-+        char *lang;
-+        int type = 0;
-+        int first = 1;
-+        int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+
-+        /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */        
-+        ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+        if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+         == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+                fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
-+
-+        if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+                fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-+
-+        if (kex->gss_client &&
-+         ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+                fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
-+
-+        switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+                dh = dh_new_group1();
-+                break;
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+                dh = dh_new_group14();
-+                break;
-+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+                debug("Doing group exchange\n");
-+                nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
-+                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+                packet_put_int(min);
-+                packet_put_int(nbits);
-+                packet_put_int(max);
-+
-+                packet_send();
-+
-+                packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+
-+                if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+                        fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+                packet_get_bignum2(p);
-+                if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+                        fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+                packet_get_bignum2(g);
-+                packet_check_eom();
-+
-+                if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-+                        fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+                         min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-+
-+                dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-+                break;
-+        default:
-+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+        }
-+        
-+        /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
-+        dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+        /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
-+        dh_server_pub = BN_new();
-+        if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
-+                fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-+
-+        token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+                        
-+        do {
-+                debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+                
-+                maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+                 kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+                 &ret_flags);
-+
-+                if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+                        if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+                                 send_tok.length);
-+                        }
-+                        fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+                }
-+
-+                /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+                if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+                        free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+                if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+                        /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+                        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+                                fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+                        /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+                        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+                                fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+                }
-+
-+                /*
-+                 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+                 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+                 */
-+                if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+                        if (first) {
-+                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
-+                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+                                 send_tok.length);
-+                                packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+                                first = 0;
-+                        } else {
-+                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+                                 send_tok.length);
-+                        }
-+                        packet_send();
-+                        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+                        /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+                        do {        
-+                                type = packet_read();
-+                                if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+                                        debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+                                        if (serverhostkey)
-+                                                fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+                                        serverhostkey =
-+                                         packet_get_string(&slen);
-+                                }
-+                        } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+                        switch (type) {
-+                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+                                debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+                                if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+                                        fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+                                recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+                                recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+                                break;
-+                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+                                debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+                                packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-+                                msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+                                msg_tok.length = strlen;
-+
-+                                /* Is there a token included? */
-+                                if (packet_get_char()) {
-+                                        recv_tok.value=
-+                                         packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+                                        recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+                                        /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+                                        if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+                                                packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+                                        } else {
-+                                                /* No token included */
-+                                                if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+                                                        packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+                                }
-+                                break;
-+                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+                                debug("Received Error");
-+                                maj_status = packet_get_int();
-+                                min_status = packet_get_int();
-+                                msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+                                lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+                                fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
-+                        default:
-+                                packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+                                 type);
-+                        }
-+                        token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+                } else {
-+                        /* No data, and not complete */
-+                        if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+                                fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+                }
-+        } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+        /*
-+         * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+         * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+         */
-+
-+        if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+                fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+        /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
-+        if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-+                packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-+
-+        /* compute K=f^x mod p */
-+        klen = DH_size(dh);
-+        kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+        kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-+        if (kout < 0)
-+                fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+        shared_secret = BN_new();
-+        if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+                fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
-+
-+        if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+                fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+        memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+        free(kbuf);
-+
-+        switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+                kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
-+                 kex->server_version_string,
-+                 buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+                 buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+                 (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+                 dh->pub_key,        /* e */
-+                 dh_server_pub,        /* f */
-+                 shared_secret,        /* K */
-+                 &hash, &hashlen
-+                );
-+                break;
-+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+                kexgex_hash(
-+                 kex->hash_alg,
-+                 kex->client_version_string,
-+                 kex->server_version_string,
-+                 buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+                 buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+                 (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+                  min, nbits, max,
-+                 dh->p, dh->g,
-+                 dh->pub_key,
-+                 dh_server_pub,
-+                 shared_secret,
-+                 &hash, &hashlen
-+                );
-+                break;
-+        default:
-+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+        }
-+
-+        gssbuf.value = hash;
-+        gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+        /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+                packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+        free(msg_tok.value);
-+
-+        DH_free(dh);
-+        if (serverhostkey)
-+                free(serverhostkey);
-+        BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+
-+        /* save session id */
-+        if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+                kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+                kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+                memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+        }
-+
-+        if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+                ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+        if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+                gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+        else
-+                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+        buffer_init(&shared_secret_buffer);
-+        buffer_put_bignum2(&shared_secret_buffer, shared_secret);
-+        kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, buffer_ptr(&shared_secret_buffer),
-+                        buffer_len(&shared_secret_buffer));
-+        buffer_free(&shared_secret_buffer);
-+        BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+        kex_finish(kex);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/kexgsss.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/kexgsss.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/kexgsss.c        1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/kexgsss.c        2014-02-15 17:31:24.000000000 -0800
-@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
-+{
-+        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+        
-+        /*
-+         * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+          * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+          * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+          * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+         */
-+
-+        OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+        gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+        Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+        u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
-+        u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+        DH *dh;
-+        int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+        BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+        Buffer shared_secret_buffer;
-+        BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+        int type = 0;
-+        gss_OID oid;
-+        char *mechs;
-+
-+        /* Initialise GSSAPI */
-+
-+        /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
-+         * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
-+         * into life
-+         */
-+        if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+                if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+                        free(mechs);
-+
-+        debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
-+        oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
-+        if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+         fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
-+
-+        debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
-+
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+                fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+
-+        switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+                dh = dh_new_group1();
-+                break;
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+                dh = dh_new_group14();
-+                break;
-+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+                debug("Doing group exchange");
-+                packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+                min = packet_get_int();
-+                nbits = packet_get_int();
-+                max = packet_get_int();
-+                min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+                max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-+                packet_check_eom();
-+                if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+                        fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+                         min, nbits, max);
-+                dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-+                if (dh == NULL)
-+                        packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+
-+                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+                packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-+                packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-+                packet_send();
-+
-+                packet_write_wait();
-+                break;
-+        default:
-+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+        }
-+
-+        dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+        do {
-+                debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+                type = packet_read();
-+                switch(type) {
-+                case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+                        if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+                                fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+                        recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+                        recv_tok.length = slen;
-+
-+                        if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+                                fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-+
-+                        packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+                        /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+                        break;
-+                case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+                        recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+                        recv_tok.length = slen;
-+                        break;
-+                default:
-+                        packet_disconnect(
-+                         "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+                         type);
-+                }
-+
-+                maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+                 &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+                free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+                if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+                        fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+                if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+                        fatal("No client public key");
-+                
-+                if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+                        debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+                        packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+                        packet_send();
-+                        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+                }
-+        } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+                if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+                        packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+                        packet_send();
-+                }
-+                fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+        }
-+
-+        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+                fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+                fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+        
-+        if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-+                packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-+
-+        klen = DH_size(dh);
-+        kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+        kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-+        if (kout < 0)
-+                fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+        shared_secret = BN_new();
-+        if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+                fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
-+
-+        if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+                fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+        memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+        free(kbuf);
-+
-+        switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+                kex_dh_hash(
-+                 kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+                 buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+                 buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+                 NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
-+                 dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
-+                 &hash, &hashlen
-+                );
-+                break;
-+        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+                kexgex_hash(
-+                 kex->hash_alg,
-+                 kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+                 buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+                 buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+                 NULL, 0,
-+                 min, nbits, max,
-+                 dh->p, dh->g,
-+                 dh_client_pub,
-+                 dh->pub_key,
-+                 shared_secret,
-+                 &hash, &hashlen
-+                );
-+                break;
-+        default:
-+                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+        }
-+
-+        BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+        if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+                kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+                kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+                memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+        }
-+
-+        gssbuf.value = hash;
-+        gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
-+                fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
-+        packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+        packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
-+
-+        if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+                packet_put_char(1); /* true */
-+                packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+        } else {
-+                packet_put_char(0); /* false */
-+        }
-+        packet_send();
-+
-+        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+        if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+                gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+        else
-+                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+        DH_free(dh);
-+
-+        buffer_init(&shared_secret_buffer);
-+        buffer_put_bignum2(&shared_secret_buffer, shared_secret);
-+        kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, buffer_ptr(&shared_secret_buffer),
-+                        buffer_len(&shared_secret_buffer));
-+        buffer_free(&shared_secret_buffer);
-+        BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+        kex_finish(kex);
-+
-+        /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+         * just exchanged. */
-+        if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+                ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+}
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/key.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/key.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/key.c        2014-01-09 15:58:53.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/key.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -979,6 +979,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] =
-          KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 },
- # endif
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-+        { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
-         { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00",
-          KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
-         { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00",
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/key.h openssh-6.5p1.patched/key.h
---- openssh-6.5p1/key.h        2014-01-09 15:58:53.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/key.h        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ enum types {
-         KEY_ED25519_CERT,
-         KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
-         KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
-+        KEY_NULL,
-         KEY_UNSPEC
- };
- enum fp_type {
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/monitor.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/monitor.c        2013-11-06 18:32:52.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/monitor.c        2014-02-15 16:53:04.000000000 -0800
-@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -247,11 +249,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
- #endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
-+#endif
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
-@@ -360,6 +369,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
-                 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+                /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
-         } else {
-                 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
-@@ -465,6 +478,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+                /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif                
-         } else {
-                 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-@@ -1834,6 +1851,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
-         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
-         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
-         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+        }
-+#endif
-         kex->server = 1;
-         kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
-         kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
-@@ -2041,6 +2065,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer
-         OM_uint32 major;
-         u_int len;
-
-+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-         goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-         goid.length = len;
-
-@@ -2068,6 +2095,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
-         OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
-         u_int len;
-
-+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-         in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-         in.length = len;
-         major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
-@@ -2085,6 +2115,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
-                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
-         }
-         return (0);
- }
-@@ -2096,6 +2127,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer
-         OM_uint32 ret;
-         u_int len;
-
-+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-         gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-         gssbuf.length = len;
-         mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-@@ -2122,7 +2156,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
- {
-         int authenticated;
-
--        authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+        authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
-+         ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
-
-         buffer_clear(m);
-         buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-@@ -2135,5 +2173,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
-         /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
-         return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+        gss_buffer_desc data;
-+        gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+        OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+        u_int len;
-+
-+        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+        data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+        data.length = len;
-+        if (data.length != 20)
-+                fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
-+                 (int) data.length);
-+
-+        /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
-+        if (session_id2_len == 0) {
-+                session_id2_len = data.length;
-+                session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-+                memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
-+        }
-+        major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-+
-+        free(data.value);
-+
-+        buffer_clear(m);
-+        buffer_put_int(m, major);
-+        buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-+
-+        mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-+
-+        gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-+
-+        /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
-+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-+        
-+        /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
-+        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
-+
-+        return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
-+        ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+        int ok;
-+
-+        store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+        store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+        store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+
-+        ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
-+
-+        free(store.filename);
-+        free(store.envvar);
-+        free(store.envval);
-+
-+        buffer_clear(m);
-+        buffer_put_int(m, ok);
-+
-+        mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
-+
-+        return(0);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h openssh-6.5p1.patched/monitor.h
---- openssh-6.5p1/monitor.h        2012-12-02 14:53:21.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/monitor.h        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
-         MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
-         MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
-
-+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 62, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 63,
-+        MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 64, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 65,
-+
-         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
-         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
-         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.c        2013-11-06 18:35:39.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/monitor_wrap.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
- }
-
- int
--mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
-         Buffer m;
-         int authenticated = 0;
-@@ -1288,5 +1288,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-         debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
-         return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-+{
-+        Buffer m;
-+        OM_uint32 major;
-+        u_int len;
-+
-+        buffer_init(&m);
-+        buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-+
-+        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+
-+        major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+        hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-+        hash->length = len;
-+
-+        buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+        return(major);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
-+{
-+        Buffer m;
-+        int ok;
-+
-+        buffer_init(&m);
-+
-+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
-+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
-+        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
-+        
-+        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+
-+        ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+
-+        buffer_free(&m);
-+        
-+        return (ok);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h openssh-6.5p1.patched/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-6.5p1/monitor_wrap.h        2011-06-19 21:42:23.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/monitor_wrap.h        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
- gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
--int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/readconf.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/readconf.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/readconf.c        2014-01-17 05:03:57.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/readconf.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ typedef enum {
-         oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
-         oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
-         oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+        oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
-+        oGssServerIdentity,
-         oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
-         oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
-         oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -186,10 +188,19 @@ static struct {
-         { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
-         { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-+        { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
-         { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+        { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
-+        { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
-+        { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
-+        { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
- #else
-         { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-+        { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
-         { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+        { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
-+        { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
-+        { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
- #endif
-         { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
-         { "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -847,10 +858,30 @@ parse_time:
-                 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
-                 goto parse_flag;
-
-+        case oGssKeyEx:
-+                intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+                goto parse_flag;
-+
-         case oGssDelegateCreds:
-                 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
-                 goto parse_flag;
-
-+        case oGssTrustDns:
-+                intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
-+                goto parse_flag;
-+
-+        case oGssClientIdentity:
-+                charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
-+                goto parse_string;
-+
-+        case oGssServerIdentity:
-+                charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
-+                goto parse_string;
-+
-+        case oGssRenewalRekey:
-+                intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
-+                goto parse_flag;
-+
-         case oBatchMode:
-                 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
-                 goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1509,7 +1540,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
-         options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
-         options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-         options->gss_authentication = -1;
-+        options->gss_keyex = -1;
-         options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+        options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
-+        options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
-+        options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
-+        options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
-         options->password_authentication = -1;
-         options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
-         options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1631,8 +1667,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
-                 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
-         if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
-                 options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+        if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+                options->gss_keyex = 0;
-         if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
-                 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+        if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
-+                options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
-+        if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-+                options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
-         if (options->password_authentication == -1)
-                 options->password_authentication = 1;
-         if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/readconf.h openssh-6.5p1.patched/readconf.h
---- openssh-6.5p1/readconf.h        2013-10-16 17:48:14.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/readconf.h        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -54,7 +54,12 @@ typedef struct {
-         int challenge_response_authentication;
-                                         /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
-         int gss_authentication;        /* Try GSS authentication */
-+        int gss_keyex;                /* Try GSS key exchange */
-         int gss_deleg_creds;        /* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+        int        gss_trust_dns;                /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
-+        int        gss_renewal_rekey;        /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
-+        char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
-+        char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
-         int password_authentication;        /* Try password
-                                                  * authentication. */
-         int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/servconf.c        2013-12-06 16:24:02.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/servconf.c        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
-         options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
-         options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
-         options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+        options->gss_keyex = -1;
-         options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+        options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
-+        options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
-         options->password_authentication = -1;
-         options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
-         options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -244,8 +247,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
-                 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
-         if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
-                 options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+        if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+                options->gss_keyex = 0;
-         if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
-                 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+        if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-+                options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
-+        if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
-+                options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
-         if (options->password_authentication == -1)
-                 options->password_authentication = 0;
-         if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -340,7 +349,9 @@ typedef enum {
-         sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
-         sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
-         sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
--        sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+        sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+        sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
-+        sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-         sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-         sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-         sHostCertificate,
-@@ -407,10 +418,20 @@ static struct {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-         { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-         { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
-         { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-         { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+        { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+        { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-         { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-         { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
-         { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1086,10 +1107,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
-                 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
-                 goto parse_flag;
-
-+        case sGssKeyEx:
-+                intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+                goto parse_flag;
-+
-         case sGssCleanupCreds:
-                 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
-                 goto parse_flag;
-
-+        case sGssStrictAcceptor:
-+                intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
-+                goto parse_flag;
-+
-+        case sGssStoreRekey:
-+                intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
-+                goto parse_flag;
-+
-         case sPasswordAuthentication:
-                 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
-                 goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1995,7 +2028,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-         dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
-         dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
-+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
-+        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
- #endif
-         dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
-         dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h openssh-6.5p1.patched/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.5p1/servconf.h        2013-12-04 19:07:28.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/servconf.h        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -112,7 +112,10 @@ typedef struct {
-         int kerberos_get_afs_token;                /* If true, try to get AFS token if
-                                                  * authenticated with Kerberos. */
-         int gss_authentication;        /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
-+        int gss_keyex;                /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
-         int gss_cleanup_creds;        /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+        int         gss_strict_acceptor;        /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
-+        int         gss_store_rekey;
-         int password_authentication;        /* If true, permit password
-                                                  * authentication. */
-         int kbd_interactive_authentication;        /* If true, permit */
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/ssh-gss.h openssh-6.5p1.patched/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-6.5p1/ssh-gss.h        2013-02-24 16:24:44.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/ssh-gss.h        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
-
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
-
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ                        40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP                                41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID                                "gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID                                "gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID                                "gss-gex-sha1-"
-+
- typedef struct {
-         char *filename;
-         char *envvar;
-         char *envval;
-+        struct passwd *owner;
-         void *data;
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
-
-@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
-         gss_buffer_desc displayname;
-         gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
-         gss_cred_id_t creds;
-+        gss_name_t name;
-         struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
-         ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+        int used;
-+        int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
-
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-         int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
-         int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
-         void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+        int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
-
- typedef struct {
-@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
-         gss_OID                oid; /* client */
-         gss_cred_id_t        creds; /* server */
-         gss_name_t        client; /* server */
--        gss_cred_id_t        client_creds; /* server */
-+        gss_cred_id_t        client_creds; /* both */
- } Gssctxt;
-
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
-
- int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -119,16 +136,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
--int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
-+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
-
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
--int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
-+
-+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config openssh-6.5p1.patched/ssh_config
---- openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config        2013-10-09 16:24:12.000000000 -0700
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/ssh_config        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- # HostbasedAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
- # BatchMode no
- # CheckHostIP yes
- # AddressFamily any
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-6.5p1.patched/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-6.5p1/ssh_config.5        2014-01-19 03:36:14.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/ssh_config.5        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -682,11 +682,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
-+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
-+identity will be used.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
-+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
-+hostname.
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
--Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
-+If set to
-+.Dq yes
-+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
-+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
-+credentials to a session on the server.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
-+Set to
-+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
-+the name of the host being connected to. If
-+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
-+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/sshconnect2.c        2014-01-09 15:58:53.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/sshconnect2.c        2014-02-15 16:54:12.000000000 -0800
-@@ -159,9 +159,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- {
-         Kex *kex;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
-+        char *gss_host = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
-         xxx_host = host;
-         xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+                /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+                 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+                orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+                if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+                        gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+                else
-+                        gss_host = host;
-+
-+                gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
-+                if (gss) {
-+                        debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+                        xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+                         "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+                }
-+        }
-+#endif
-+
-         if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
-                 logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
-                 options.ciphers = NULL;
-@@ -197,6 +222,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
-         if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
-                 myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+         * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+        if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
-+                orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+                xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+                 "%s,null", orig);
-+                free(gss);
-+        }
-+#endif
-+
-         if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
-                 packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
-                  (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
-@@ -208,11 +244,31 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
-         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
-         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
-         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+        }
-+#endif
-         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
-         kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
-         kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
-         kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+                kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
-+                kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
-+                kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
-+                if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+                        kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+                } else {
-+                        kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+                }
-+        }
-+#endif
-+
-         xxx_kex = kex;
-
-         dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-@@ -302,6 +358,7 @@ void        input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int3
- void        input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void        input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- void        input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-+int        userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
- #endif
-
- void        userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-@@ -317,6 +374,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
-
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+        {"gssapi-keyex",
-+                userauth_gsskeyex,
-+                NULL,
-+                &options.gss_authentication,
-+                NULL},
-         {"gssapi-with-mic",
-                 userauth_gssapi,
-                 NULL,
-@@ -613,19 +675,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
-         static u_int mech = 0;
-         OM_uint32 min;
-         int ok = 0;
-+        const char *gss_host;
-+
-+        if (options.gss_server_identity)
-+                gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+        else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+                gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+        else
-+                gss_host = authctxt->host;
-
-         /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
-          * once. */
-
-         if (gss_supported == NULL)
--                gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
-+                if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
-+                        gss_supported = NULL;
-+                        return 0;
-+                }
-
-         /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
-         while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
-                 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
-                 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
-                  ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
--                 &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
-+                 &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
-+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
-                         ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
-                 } else {
-                         mech++;
-@@ -722,8 +796,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_
- {
-         Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-         Gssctxt *gssctxt;
--        int oidlen;
--        char *oidv;
-+        u_int oidlen;
-+        u_char *oidv;
-
-         if (authctxt == NULL)
-                 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-@@ -832,6 +906,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
-         free(msg);
-         free(lang);
- }
-+
-+int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+        Buffer b;
-+        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+        gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+        OM_uint32 ms;
-+
-+        static int attempt = 0;
-+        if (attempt++ >= 1)
-+                return (0);
-+
-+        if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
-+                debug("No valid Key exchange context");
-+                return (0);
-+        }
-+
-+        ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+         "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+        gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
-+                buffer_free(&b);
-+                return (0);
-+        }
-+
-+        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-+        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-+        packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-+        packet_send();
-+
-+        buffer_free(&b);
-+        gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
-+
-+        return (1);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- int
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c openssh-6.5p1.patched/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.5p1/sshd.c        2014-01-27 20:08:13.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/sshd.c        2014-02-15 16:54:54.000000000 -0800
-@@ -122,6 +122,10 @@
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "version.h"
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef LIBWRAP
- #include <tcpd.h>
- #include <syslog.h>
-@@ -1735,10 +1739,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-                 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
-                 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-         }
-+#ifndef GSSAPI
-+        /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
-         if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
-                 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
-                 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
-         }
-+#endif
-         if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
-                 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
-                 exit(1);
-@@ -2065,6 +2072,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-          remote_ip, remote_port,
-          get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port());
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+        /*
-+         * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
-+         * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
-+         * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
-+         * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
-+         * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
-+         *
-+         * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
-+         * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
-+         * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
-+         * same session (bad).
-+         *
-+         * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
-+         * automatically.
-+         *
-+         * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
-+         * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
-+         */
-+        {
-+                OSStatus err = 0;
-+                SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
-+                SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
-+
-+                err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
-+                if (err)
-+                        error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+                         (unsigned) err);
-+                else
-+                        debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+                         (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+
-+                if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
-+                        debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
-+                         "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
-+                else {
-+                        debug("Creating new security session...");
-+                        err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
-+                        if (err)
-+                                error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
-+                                 (unsigned) err);
-+
-+                        err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
-+                         &sattrs);
-+                        if (err)
-+                                error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+                                 (unsigned) err);
-+                        else
-+                                debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+                                 (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+                }
-+        }
-+#endif
-+
-         /*
-          * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
-          * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2476,6 +2537,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
-         myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
-          list_hostkey_types());
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        {
-+        char *orig;
-+        char *gss = NULL;
-+        char *newstr = NULL;
-+        orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+        /*
-+         * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+         * the other key exchange algorithms
-+         */
-+
-+        if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+                orig = NULL;
-+
-+        if (options.gss_keyex)
-+                gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+        else
-+                gss = NULL;
-+
-+        if (gss && orig)
-+                xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+        else if (gss)
-+                newstr = gss;
-+        else if (orig)
-+                newstr = orig;
-+
-+        /*
-+         * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+         * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+          * host key algorithm we support
-+         */
-+        if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+                myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+        if (newstr)
-+                myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+        else
-+                fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+        }
-+#endif
-+
-         /* start key exchange */
-         kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
-         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
-@@ -2484,6 +2587,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
-         kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
-         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
-         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+        if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+        }
-+#endif
-         kex->server = 1;
-         kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
-         kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config openssh-6.5p1.patched/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config        2014-01-12 00:20:47.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/sshd_config        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile        .ssh/authorized_keys
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff -Nrup openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-6.5p1.patched/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.5p1/sshd_config.5        2013-12-17 22:47:03.000000000 -0800
-+++ openssh-6.5p1.patched/sshd_config.5        2014-02-15 16:50:46.000000000 -0800
-@@ -493,12 +493,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
-+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
-+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
-+a client authenticates against. If
-+.Dq yes
-+then the client must authenticate against the
-+.Pa host
-+service on the current hostname. If
-+.Dq no
-+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
-+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
-+on multi homed machines.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
-+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
-+and setting it to
-+.Dq no
-+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
-+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
-+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
-+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
-+.Dq no .
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
</del></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh67p1gsskexall20140907patchfromrev129548trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh63p1gsskexall20130920patch"></a>
<div class="copfile"><h4>Copied: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch (from rev 129548, trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch) (0 => 129549)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch         (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch        2014-12-15 15:16:10 UTC (rev 129549)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -0,0 +1,2899 @@
</span><ins>+--- a/ChangeLog.gssapi.old
++++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++20110101
++ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
++ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
++
++20100308
++ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
++ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
++ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
++ Watson.
++ -
++
++20100124
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
++ Colin Watson
++
++20090615
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++ sshd.c ]
++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++        Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++        Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++        Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++        Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++        Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++        Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++        Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++        Cast data.length before printing
++        If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++ - [ gss-serv.c ]
++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++ Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
++ function
++
++20061220
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++ ssh-gss.h ]
++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++ <Bugzilla #928>
++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++ configuration files
++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++ only, where they belong
++ <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
++ variable
++
++20060828
++ - [ gss-genr.c ]
++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
++ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++ fix compiler errors/warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ fix uninitialized variable warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ gssgenr.c ]
++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Bugzilla #1220 >
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+--- a/Makefile.in.old
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
+         atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+         monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+         kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
++        kexgssc.o \
+         msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+         ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+         kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
+@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@
+         auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+         monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
+         kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
+-        auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++        auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+         loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+         sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+         roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
+--- a/auth-krb5.c.old
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -183,8 +183,13 @@
+
+         len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+         authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++        snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++         authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+         snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+          authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+         if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -241,15 +246,22 @@
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-        int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
++        int ret;
+         char ccname[40];
+         mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++        char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++        char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++        int tmpfd, oerrno;
++#endif
+
+         ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+-         "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++         cctemplate, geteuid());
+         if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+                 return ENOMEM;
+
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+         old_umask = umask(0177);
+         tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+         oerrno = errno;
+@@ -266,6 +278,7 @@
+                 return oerrno;
+         }
+         close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+
+         return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+--- a/auth2-gss.c.old
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -53,6 +53,40 @@
+ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
++/*
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++        int authenticated = 0;
++        Buffer b;
++        gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++        u_int len;
++
++        mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++        mic.length = len;
++
++        packet_check_eom();
++
++        ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++         "gssapi-keyex");
++
++        gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++        /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++        if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++         &gssbuf, &mic))))
++                authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++                 authctxt->pw));
++        
++        buffer_free(&b);
++        free(mic.value);
++
++        return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -236,7 +270,8 @@
+
+         packet_check_eom();
+
+-        authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++        authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++         authctxt->pw));
+
+         authctxt->postponed = 0;
+         dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -271,7 +306,8 @@
+         gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+         if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+-                authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++                authenticated =
++                 PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+         else
+                 logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+@@ -286,6 +322,12 @@
+         userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ }
+
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++        "gssapi-keyex",
++        userauth_gsskeyex,
++        &options.gss_authentication
++};
++
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+         "gssapi-with-mic",
+         userauth_gssapi,
+--- a/auth2.c.old
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
+         &method_none,
+         &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++        &method_gsskeyex,
+         &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+         &method_passwd,
+--- a/clientloop.c.old
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
+ #include "msg.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+
+@@ -1630,6 +1634,15 @@
+                 /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+                 if (!rekeying) {
+                         channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++                        if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++                         ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
++                                debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++                                need_rekeying = 1;
++                        }
++#endif
++
+                         if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
+                                 debug("need rekeying");
+                                 xxx_kex->done = 0;
+--- a/configure.ac.old
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -584,6 +584,30 @@
+          [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+         AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+          [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++        AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
++        AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++                [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++                [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++                 AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
++                        [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++                 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++                 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
++                [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++                 AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
++        AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
++        AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++                [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++                [cc_context_t c;
++                 (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++                [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
++                        [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++                 LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++                 AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
++                 if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++                        AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
++                fi],
++                [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
++        )
+         m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+         AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+          AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+--- a/gss-genr.c.old
++++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.22 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
++typedef struct {
++        char *encoded;
++        gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
++        return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++        gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++        OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++        if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
++                return NULL;
++
++        return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++         host, client));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++ const char *host, const char *client) {
++        Buffer buf;
++        size_t i;
++        int oidpos, enclen;
++        char *mechs, *encoded;
++        u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++        char deroid[2];
++        const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++        EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++        if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++                for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++                        free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++                free(gss_enc2oid);
++        }
++
++        gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++         (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++        buffer_init(&buf);
++
++        oidpos = 0;
++        for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++                if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++                 (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++
++                        deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++                        deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++                        EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++                        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++                        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++                         gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++                         gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++                        EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++                        encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++                        enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++                         encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++                        if (oidpos != 0)
++                                buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++                         sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++                        buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++                         sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++                        buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++                        buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++                         sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++                        buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++                        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++                        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++                        oidpos++;
++                }
++        }
++        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++        gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++        buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++        mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++        buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++        buffer_free(&buf);
++
++        if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++                free(mechs);
++                mechs = NULL;
++        }
++        
++        return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++        int i = 0;
++        
++        switch (kex_type) {
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
++                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++                break;
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
++                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++                break;
++        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++                if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
++                        return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++                name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++                break;
++        default:
++                return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++        }
++
++        while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++         strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++                i++;
++
++        if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++                ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++        return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@
+         }
+
+         ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+-         GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
++         ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+          GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+          0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@
+ }
+
+ OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
++{
++        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++        gss_name_t gssname;
++        OM_uint32 status;
++        gss_OID_set oidset;
++
++        gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
++        gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
++
++        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++        gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++        ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
++         GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
++
++        if (!ctx->major)
++                ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++                 gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
++                 &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++        gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
++        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++
++        if (ctx->major)
++                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++
++        return(ctx->major);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++        if (ctx == NULL)
++                return -1;
++
+         if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+          GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+                 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@
+         return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++        if (ctx == NULL)
++                return -1;
++
++        ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++         gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++        return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ const char *context)
+@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@
+ }
+
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
++ const char *client)
+ {
+         gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+         OM_uint32 major, minor;
+         gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++        Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++        if (ctx == NULL)
++                ctx = &intctx;
+
+         /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+         if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@
+         ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+         ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+         major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
++
++        if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
++                major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
++
+         if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+                 major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+                  NULL);
+@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@
+                          GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+         }
+
+-        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++        if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
+                 ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+         return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
++        static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++        static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
++        static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
++        static gss_name_t name;
++        static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
++        OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
++        int equal;
++        gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
++        
++        now = time(NULL);
++
++        if (ctxt) {
++                debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
++
++                if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
++                        gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
++
++                major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++                 &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++
++                if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++                        saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
++                 saved_lifetime+= now;
++                } else {
++                        /* Handle the error */
++                }
++                return 0;
++        }
++
++        if (now - last_call < 10)
++                return 0;
++
++        last_call = now;
++
++        if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++                return 0;
++        
++        major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++         &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++        if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
++                return 0;
++        else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++                return 0;
++
++        major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
++        gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
++        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++                return 0;
++
++        if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
++                return 1;
++
++        return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c.old
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@
+         OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+         int len;
+         const char *errmsg;
++        const char *new_ccname;
+
+         if (client->creds == NULL) {
+                 debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -181,11 +182,16 @@
+                 return;
+         }
+
+-        client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++        new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+         client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+-        len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+-        client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+-        snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++        xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++        client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++        xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
++        client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+         if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -197,6 +203,71 @@
+         return;
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
++ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++        krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++        krb5_principal principal = NULL;
++        char *name = NULL;
++        krb5_error_code problem;
++        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++         if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ return 0;
++         }
++        
++        /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
++        if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
++         &principal))) {
++                logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
++                 krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++                return 0;
++        }
++
++        if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
++                logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
++                 krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++                return 0;
++        }
++
++
++        if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
++                debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
++                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++                krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++                return 0;
++        }
++        krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++
++        /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
++
++        if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
++                logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
++                 krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++                krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++                return 0;
++        }
++
++        krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++
++        if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
++         ccache))) {
++                logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
++                krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++                return 0;
++        }
++
++        return 1;
++}
++
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+         "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+         "Kerberos",
+@@ -204,7 +275,8 @@
+         NULL,
+         &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+         NULL,
+-        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
++        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++        &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+--- a/gss-serv.c.old
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -100,25 +105,32 @@
+         char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
+         gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+-        gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-        gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++        if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
++                gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++                gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++                if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
++                        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++                        return (-1);
++                }
+
+-        if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
+-                gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-                return (-1);
+-        }
++                if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
++                        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++                        return (ctx->major);
++                }
++
++                if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++                 ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
++                 NULL, NULL)))
++                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+-        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+                 gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+                 return (ctx->major);
++        } else {
++                ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++                ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+         }
+-
+-        if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+-         ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+-                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+-
+-        gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+-        return (ctx->major);
++        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ /* Privileged */
+@@ -133,6 +145,29 @@
+ }
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
++        gss_OID_set        supported;
++
++        ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
++        return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
++         NULL, NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++ const char *dummy) {
++        Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++        int res;
++
++        res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++        ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++        return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -142,7 +177,9 @@
+         gss_OID_set supported;
+
+         gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+-        gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++        if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++                return;
+
+         while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+                 if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -268,8 +305,48 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+         int i = 0;
++        int equal = 0;
++        gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++        gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++        if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++                if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++                 (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++                 ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++                        debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++                        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++                }
++
++                if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++                 ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
++                 NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++                        return (ctx->major);
++                }
++
++                ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
++                 new_name, &equal);
+
+-        gss_buffer_desc ename;
++                if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++                        ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++                        return (ctx->major);
++                }
++
++                if (!equal) {
++                        debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++                        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++                }
++
++                debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++                gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++                gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++                client->name = new_name;
++                client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++         ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++                client->updated = 1;
++                return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++        }
+
+         client->mech = NULL;
+
+@@ -284,6 +361,13 @@
+         if (client->mech == NULL)
+                 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
++        if (ctx->client_creds &&
++         (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++         ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++                ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++                return (ctx->major);
++        }
++
+         if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+          &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+                 ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -301,6 +385,8 @@
+                 return (ctx->major);
+         }
+
++        gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+         /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+         client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+         ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -348,7 +434,7 @@
+
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+         OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+@@ -358,9 +444,11 @@
+                 return 0;
+         }
+         if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+-                if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++                if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++                        gssapi_client.used = 1;
++                        gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+                         return 1;
+-                else {
++                } else {
+                         /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+                         gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+                         gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -374,14 +462,90 @@
+         return (0);
+ }
+
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+-        ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+-         gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++        return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+
+-        return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
++        int ok;
++        int ret;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++        pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++        struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++        char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++        if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
++         gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++         gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++                return;
++
++        ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++
++        if (!ok)
++                return;
++
++        debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++        /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++         * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++         * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++         */
++#ifdef USE_PAM        
++        if (!use_privsep) {
++                debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++                return;
++        }
++
++        ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++          &pamconv, &pamh);
++        if (ret)
++                return;
++
++        xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
++         gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++        ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++        if (!ret)
++                pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++        pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++        int ok = 0;
++
++        /* Check we've got credentials to store */
++        if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++                return 0;
++
++        gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++        temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++        if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++                ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++        else
++                debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++        restore_uid();
++
++        return ok;
+ }
+
+ #endif
+--- a/kex.c.old
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -94,6 +98,11 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+         { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++        { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++        { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++#endif
+         { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
+
+--- a/kex.h.old
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@
+         KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+         KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+         KEX_C25519_SHA256,
++        KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++        KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++        KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+         KEX_MAX
+ };
+
+@@ -135,6 +138,12 @@
+         int        flags;
+         int        hash_alg;
+         int        ec_nid;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        int        gss_deleg_creds;
++        int        gss_trust_dns;
++        char *gss_host;
++        char        *gss_client;
++#endif
+         char        *client_version_string;
+         char        *server_version_string;
+         int        (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+@@ -167,6 +176,11 @@
+ void         kexc25519_client(Kex *);
+ void         kexc25519_server(Kex *);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++void        kexgss_client(Kex *);
++void        kexgss_server(Kex *);
++#endif
++
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+ BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+--- a/kexgssc.c.old
++++ b/kexgssc.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++void
++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
++        gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++        gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++        Gssctxt *ctxt;
++        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++        u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
++        DH *dh;
++        BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++        BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++        BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++        BIGNUM *g = NULL;        
++        u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++        u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++        u_char *empty = "";
++        char *msg;
++        char *lang;
++        int type = 0;
++        int first = 1;
++        int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++
++        /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */        
++        ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++        if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
++         == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++                fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++        if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++                fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++        if (kex->gss_client &&
++         ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++                fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++        switch (kex->kex_type) {
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++                dh = dh_new_group1();
++                break;
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++                dh = dh_new_group14();
++                break;
++        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++                debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++                nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
++                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++                packet_put_int(min);
++                packet_put_int(nbits);
++                packet_put_int(max);
++
++                packet_send();
++
++                packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++                if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++                        fatal("BN_new() failed");
++                packet_get_bignum2(p);
++                if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++                        fatal("BN_new() failed");
++                packet_get_bignum2(g);
++                packet_check_eom();
++
++                if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++                        fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++                         min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++                dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++                break;
++        default:
++                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++        }
++        
++        /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++        dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++        /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++        dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++        if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++                fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++        token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++                        
++        do {
++                debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++                
++                maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++                 kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++                 &ret_flags);
++
++                if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++                        if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++                                 send_tok.length);
++                        }
++                        fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++                }
++
++                /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++                if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++                        free(recv_tok.value);
++
++                if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++                        /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++                        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++                                fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++                        /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++                        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++                                fatal("Integrity check failed");
++                }
++
++                /*
++                 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++                 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++                 */
++                if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++                        if (first) {
++                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++                                 send_tok.length);
++                                packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++                                first = 0;
++                        } else {
++                                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++                                packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++                                 send_tok.length);
++                        }
++                        packet_send();
++                        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++                        /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++                        do {        
++                                type = packet_read();
++                                if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++                                        debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++                                        if (serverhostkey)
++                                                fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++                                        serverhostkey =
++                                         packet_get_string(&slen);
++                                }
++                        } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++                        switch (type) {
++                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++                                debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++                                if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++                                        fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++                                recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++                                recv_tok.length = strlen;
++                                break;
++                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++                                debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++                                packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++                                msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++                                msg_tok.length = strlen;
++
++                                /* Is there a token included? */
++                                if (packet_get_char()) {
++                                        recv_tok.value=
++                                         packet_get_string(&strlen);
++                                        recv_tok.length = strlen;
++                                        /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++                                        if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++                                                packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++                                        } else {
++                                                /* No token included */
++                                                if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++                                                        packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++                                }
++                                break;
++                        case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++                                debug("Received Error");
++                                maj_status = packet_get_int();
++                                min_status = packet_get_int();
++                                msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++                                lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++                                fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++                        default:
++                                packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++                                 type);
++                        }
++                        token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++                } else {
++                        /* No data, and not complete */
++                        if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++                                fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++                }
++        } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++        /*
++         * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++         * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
++         */
++
++        if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++                fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++        /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++        if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++                packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++        /* compute K=f^x mod p */
++        klen = DH_size(dh);
++        kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++        kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++        if (kout < 0)
++                fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++        shared_secret = BN_new();
++        if (shared_secret == NULL)
++                fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
++
++        if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++                fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++        memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++        free(kbuf);
++
++        switch (kex->kex_type) {
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++                kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
++                 kex->server_version_string,
++                 buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++                 buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++                 (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++                 dh->pub_key,        /* e */
++                 dh_server_pub,        /* f */
++                 shared_secret,        /* K */
++                 &hash, &hashlen
++                );
++                break;
++        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++                kexgex_hash(
++                 kex->hash_alg,
++                 kex->client_version_string,
++                 kex->server_version_string,
++                 buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++                 buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++                 (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++                  min, nbits, max,
++                 dh->p, dh->g,
++                 dh->pub_key,
++                 dh_server_pub,
++                 shared_secret,
++                 &hash, &hashlen
++                );
++                break;
++        default:
++                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++        }
++
++        gssbuf.value = hash;
++        gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++        /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++                packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++        free(msg_tok.value);
++
++        DH_free(dh);
++        if (serverhostkey)
++                free(serverhostkey);
++        BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++        /* save session id */
++        if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++                kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++                kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++                memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++        }
++
++        if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++                ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++
++        if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++                gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++        else
++                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++        kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++        BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++        kex_finish(kex);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+--- a/kexgsss.c.old
++++ b/kexgsss.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++void
++kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
++{
++        OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++        
++        /*
++         * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++          * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
++          * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
++          * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++         */
++
++        OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++        gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++        Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++        u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
++        u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++        DH *dh;
++        int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++        BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++        BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++        int type = 0;
++        gss_OID oid;
++        char *mechs;
++
++        /* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++        /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++         * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++         * into life
++         */
++        if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
++                if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
++                        free(mechs);
++
++        debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++        oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
++        if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++         fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++        debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++        if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++                fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++        switch (kex->kex_type) {
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++                dh = dh_new_group1();
++                break;
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++                dh = dh_new_group14();
++                break;
++        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++                debug("Doing group exchange");
++                packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++                min = packet_get_int();
++                nbits = packet_get_int();
++                max = packet_get_int();
++                min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++                max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
++                packet_check_eom();
++                if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++                        fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++                         min, nbits, max);
++                dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++                if (dh == NULL)
++                        packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++                packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++                packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++                packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++                packet_send();
++
++                packet_write_wait();
++                break;
++        default:
++                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++        }
++
++        dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++        do {
++                debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++                type = packet_read();
++                switch(type) {
++                case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++                        if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
++                                fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++                        recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++                        recv_tok.length = slen;
++
++                        if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++                                fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++                        packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++                        /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++                        break;
++                case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++                        recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++                        recv_tok.length = slen;
++                        break;
++                default:
++                        packet_disconnect(
++                         "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++                         type);
++                }
++
++                maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++                 &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++                free(recv_tok.value);
++
++                if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++                        fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++                if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++                        fatal("No client public key");
++                
++                if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++                        debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++                        packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++                        packet_send();
++                        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++                }
++        } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++        if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++                if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++                        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++                        packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++                        packet_send();
++                }
++                fatal("accept_ctx died");
++        }
++
++        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++                fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++        if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++                fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++        
++        if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++                packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++        klen = DH_size(dh);
++        kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++        kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++        if (kout < 0)
++                fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++        shared_secret = BN_new();
++        if (shared_secret == NULL)
++                fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
++
++        if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++                fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++        memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++        free(kbuf);
++
++        switch (kex->kex_type) {
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++        case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++                kex_dh_hash(
++                 kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++                 buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++                 buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++                 NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++                 dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++                 &hash, &hashlen
++                );
++                break;
++        case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++                kexgex_hash(
++                 kex->hash_alg,
++                 kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++                 buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++                 buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++                 NULL, 0,
++                 min, nbits, max,
++                 dh->p, dh->g,
++                 dh_client_pub,
++                 dh->pub_key,
++                 shared_secret,
++                 &hash, &hashlen
++                );
++                break;
++        default:
++                fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++        }
++
++        BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++        if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++                kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++                kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++                memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++        }
++
++        gssbuf.value = hash;
++        gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++        if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++                fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++        packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++        packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++        if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++                packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++                packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++        } else {
++                packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++        }
++        packet_send();
++
++        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++        gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++        if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++                gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++        else
++                ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++        DH_free(dh);
++
++        kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++        BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++        kex_finish(kex);
++
++        /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++         * just exchanged. */
++        if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++                ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+--- a/monitor.c.old
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -255,11 +257,18 @@
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
++#endif
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ #endif
+@@ -374,6 +383,10 @@
+                 /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++                /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+         } else {
+                 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+@@ -482,6 +495,10 @@
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++                /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif                
+         } else {
+                 mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1861,6 +1878,13 @@
+         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+ #endif
+         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        if (options.gss_keyex) {
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++        }
++#endif
+         kex->server = 1;
+         kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+         kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+@@ -2068,6 +2092,9 @@
+         OM_uint32 major;
+         u_int len;
+
++        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+         goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+         goid.length = len;
+
+@@ -2095,6 +2122,9 @@
+         OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+         u_int len;
+
++        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+         in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+         in.length = len;
+         major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+@@ -2112,6 +2142,7 @@
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+                 monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++                monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+         }
+         return (0);
+ }
+@@ -2123,6 +2154,9 @@
+         OM_uint32 ret;
+         u_int len;
+
++        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+         gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+         gssbuf.length = len;
+         mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -2149,7 +2183,11 @@
+ {
+         int authenticated;
+
+-        authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++        authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
++         ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+
+         buffer_clear(m);
+         buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -2162,5 +2200,73 @@
+         /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+         return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++        gss_buffer_desc data;
++        gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++        OM_uint32 major, minor;
++        u_int len;
++
++        if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++                fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++        data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++        data.length = len;
++        if (data.length != 20)
++                fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
++                 (int) data.length);
++
++        /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++        if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++                session_id2_len = data.length;
++                session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++                memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++        }
++        major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++        free(data.value);
++
++        buffer_clear(m);
++        buffer_put_int(m, major);
++        buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++        mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++        gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++        /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++        
++        /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
++        monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
++
++        return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
++        ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++        int ok;
++
++        store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++        store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++        store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++
++        ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
++
++        free(store.filename);
++        free(store.envvar);
++        free(store.envval);
++
++        buffer_clear(m);
++        buffer_put_int(m, ok);
++
++        mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
++
++        return(0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+--- a/monitor.h.old
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
+         MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+         MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+
++        MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 62, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 63,
++        MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 64, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 65,
++
+         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+         MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c.old
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@
+ }
+
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+         Buffer m;
+         int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1298,5 +1298,50 @@
+         debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+         return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++        Buffer m;
++        OM_uint32 major;
++        u_int len;
++
++        buffer_init(&m);
++        buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++        major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++        hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++        hash->length = len;
++
++        buffer_free(&m);
++
++        return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
++{
++        Buffer m;
++        int ok;
++
++        buffer_init(&m);
++
++        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
++        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
++        buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
++        
++        mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++
++        ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
++
++        buffer_free(&m);
++        
++        return (ok);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h.old
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+--- a/readconf.c.old
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@
+         oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+         oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+         oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++        oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
++        oGssServerIdentity,
+         oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+         oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+         oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -188,10 +190,19 @@
+         { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+         { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++        { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+         { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++        { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
++        { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
++        { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
++        { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+         { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++        { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+         { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++        { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
++        { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
++        { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+         { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+         { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -871,10 +882,30 @@
+                 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                 goto parse_flag;
+
++        case oGssKeyEx:
++                intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++                goto parse_flag;
++
+         case oGssDelegateCreds:
+                 intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+                 goto parse_flag;
+
++        case oGssTrustDns:
++                intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++                goto parse_flag;
++
++        case oGssClientIdentity:
++                charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
++                goto parse_string;
++
++        case oGssServerIdentity:
++                charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
++                goto parse_string;
++
++        case oGssRenewalRekey:
++                intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
++                goto parse_flag;
++
+         case oBatchMode:
+                 intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+                 goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1550,7 +1581,12 @@
+         options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+         options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+         options->gss_authentication = -1;
++        options->gss_keyex = -1;
+         options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++        options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
++        options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
++        options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
++        options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+         options->password_authentication = -1;
+         options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+         options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1676,8 +1712,14 @@
+                 options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+         if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+                 options->gss_authentication = 0;
++        if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++                options->gss_keyex = 0;
+         if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+                 options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++        if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++                options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
++        if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
++                options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+         if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+                 options->password_authentication = 1;
+         if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+--- a/readconf.h.old
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@
+         int challenge_response_authentication;
+                                         /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+         int gss_authentication;        /* Try GSS authentication */
++        int gss_keyex;                /* Try GSS key exchange */
+         int gss_deleg_creds;        /* Delegate GSS credentials */
++        int        gss_trust_dns;                /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
++        int        gss_renewal_rekey;        /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
++        char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
++        char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
+         int password_authentication;        /* Try password
+                                                  * authentication. */
+         int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+--- a/servconf.c.old
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -109,7 +109,10 @@
+         options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+         options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+         options->gss_authentication=-1;
++        options->gss_keyex = -1;
+         options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++        options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++        options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+         options->password_authentication = -1;
+         options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+         options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -250,8 +253,14 @@
+                 options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+         if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+                 options->gss_authentication = 0;
++        if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++                options->gss_keyex = 0;
+         if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+                 options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++        if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
++                options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
++        if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
++                options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+         if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+                 options->password_authentication = 0;
+         if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -352,7 +361,9 @@
+         sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+         sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+         sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+-        sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++        sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++        sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
++        sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+         sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+         sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+         sHostCertificate,
+@@ -421,10 +432,20 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+         { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+         { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+         { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+         { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++        { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++        { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+         { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+         { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+         { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1104,10 +1125,22 @@
+                 intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+                 goto parse_flag;
+
++        case sGssKeyEx:
++                intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++                goto parse_flag;
++
+         case sGssCleanupCreds:
+                 intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+                 goto parse_flag;
+
++        case sGssStrictAcceptor:
++                intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
++                goto parse_flag;
++
++        case sGssStoreRekey:
++                intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
++                goto parse_flag;
++
+         case sPasswordAuthentication:
+                 intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+                 goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2042,7 +2075,10 @@
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+         dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
++        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+         dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
++        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
++        dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+         dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+         dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+--- a/servconf.h.old
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -113,7 +113,10 @@
+         int kerberos_get_afs_token;                /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+                                                  * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+         int gss_authentication;        /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++        int gss_keyex;                /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+         int gss_cleanup_creds;        /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++        int         gss_strict_acceptor;        /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
++        int         gss_store_rekey;
+         int password_authentication;        /* If true, permit password
+                                                  * authentication. */
+         int kbd_interactive_authentication;        /* If true, permit */
+--- a/ssh-gss.h.old
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
+
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ                        40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP                                41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID                                "gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID                                "gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID                                "gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+         char *filename;
+         char *envvar;
+         char *envval;
++        struct passwd *owner;
+         void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+
+@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@
+         gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+         gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+         gss_cred_id_t creds;
++        gss_name_t name;
+         struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+         ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++        int used;
++        int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@
+         int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+         int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+         void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++        int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@
+         gss_OID                oid; /* client */
+         gss_cred_id_t        creds; /* server */
+         gss_name_t        client; /* server */
+-        gss_cred_id_t        client_creds; /* server */
++        gss_cred_id_t        client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -119,16 +136,30 @@
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++ const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+--- a/ssh_config.old
++++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ # HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++# GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ # BatchMode no
+ # CheckHostIP yes
+ # AddressFamily any
+--- a/ssh_config.5.old
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -701,11 +701,43 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
++identity will be used.
++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
++hostname.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++If set to
++.Dq yes
++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
++credentials to a session on the server.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+--- a/sshconnect2.c.old
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -160,9 +160,34 @@
+         char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+         Kex *kex;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++        char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+         xxx_host = host;
+         xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        if (options.gss_keyex) {
++                /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++                 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++                orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++                if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++                        gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++                else
++                        gss_host = host;
++
++                gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++                if (gss) {
++                        debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++                        xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++                         "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++                }
++        }
++#endif
++
+         if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+                 logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+                 options.ciphers = NULL;
+@@ -200,6 +225,17 @@
+         myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+          myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++         * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++        if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
++                orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++                xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++                 "%s,null", orig);
++                free(gss);
++        }
++#endif
++
+         if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+                 packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
+                  (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+@@ -214,10 +250,30 @@
+         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+ #endif
+         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        if (options.gss_keyex) {
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++        }
++#endif
+         kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+         kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+         kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        if (options.gss_keyex) {
++                kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++                kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++                kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
++                if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++                        kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++                } else {
++                        kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++ }
++        }
++#endif
++
+         xxx_kex = kex;
+
+         dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+@@ -307,6 +363,7 @@
+ void        input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void        input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void        input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int        userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+
+ void        userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -322,6 +379,11 @@
+
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++        {"gssapi-keyex",
++                userauth_gsskeyex,
++                NULL,
++                &options.gss_authentication,
++                NULL},
+         {"gssapi-with-mic",
+                 userauth_gssapi,
+                 NULL,
+@@ -618,19 +680,31 @@
+         static u_int mech = 0;
+         OM_uint32 min;
+         int ok = 0;
++        const char *gss_host;
++
++        if (options.gss_server_identity)
++                gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++        else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++                gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
++        else
++                gss_host = authctxt->host;
+
+         /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+          * once. */
+
+         if (gss_supported == NULL)
+-                gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
++                if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
++                        gss_supported = NULL;
++                        return 0;
++                }
+
+         /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+         while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+                 /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+                 if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+                  ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+-                 &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++                 &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
++ options.gss_client_identity)) {
+                         ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+                 } else {
+                         mech++;
+@@ -727,8 +801,8 @@
+ {
+         Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+         Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+-        int oidlen;
+-        char *oidv;
++        u_int oidlen;
++        u_char *oidv;
+
+         if (authctxt == NULL)
+                 fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -837,6 +911,48 @@
+         free(msg);
+         free(lang);
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++        Buffer b;
++        gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++        gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++        OM_uint32 ms;
++
++        static int attempt = 0;
++        if (attempt++ >= 1)
++                return (0);
++
++        if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++                debug("No valid Key exchange context");
++                return (0);
++        }
++
++        ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++         "gssapi-keyex");
++
++        gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++        gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++        if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++                buffer_free(&b);
++                return (0);
++        }
++
++        packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++        packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++        packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++        packet_send();
++
++        buffer_free(&b);
++        gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++        return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ int
+--- a/sshd.c.old
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef O_NOCTTY
+ #define O_NOCTTY        0
+ #endif
+@@ -1752,10 +1756,13 @@
+                 logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+                 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+         }
++#ifndef GSSAPI
++        /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+         if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+                 logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+                 options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+         }
++#endif
+         if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+                 logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+                 exit(1);
+@@ -2067,6 +2074,60 @@
+          remote_ip, remote_port,
+          get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port());
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++        /*
++         * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
++         * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
++         * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
++         * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
++         * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
++         *
++         * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
++         * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
++         * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
++         * same session (bad).
++         *
++         * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
++         * automatically.
++         *
++         * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
++         * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
++         */
++        {
++                OSStatus err = 0;
++                SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
++                SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
++
++                err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
++                if (err)
++                        error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++                         (unsigned) err);
++                else
++                        debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++                         (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++
++                if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
++                        debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
++                         "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
++                else {
++                        debug("Creating new security session...");
++                        err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
++                        if (err)
++                                error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
++                                 (unsigned) err);
++
++                        err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
++                         &sattrs);
++                        if (err)
++                                error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++                                 (unsigned) err);
++                        else
++                                debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++                                 (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++                }
++        }
++#endif
++
+         /*
+          * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+          * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2489,6 +2550,48 @@
+         myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+          list_hostkey_types());
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        {
++        char *orig;
++        char *gss = NULL;
++        char *newstr = NULL;
++        orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++        /*
++         * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++         * the other key exchange algorithms
++         */
++
++        if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++                orig = NULL;
++
++        if (options.gss_keyex)
++                gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++        else
++                gss = NULL;
++
++        if (gss && orig)
++                xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++        else if (gss)
++                newstr = gss;
++        else if (orig)
++                newstr = orig;
++
++        /*
++         * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++         * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++          * host key algorithm we support
++         */
++        if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++                myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++        if (newstr)
++                myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++        else
++                fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++        }
++#endif
++
+         /* start key exchange */
+         kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+@@ -2499,6 +2602,13 @@
+         kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+ #endif
+         kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++        if (options.gss_keyex) {
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++                kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++        }
++#endif
+         kex->server = 1;
+         kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+         kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+--- a/sshd_config.old
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+--- a/sshd_config.5.old
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -527,12 +527,40 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
++a client authenticates against. If
++.Dq yes
++then the client must authenticate against the
++.Pa host
++service on the current hostname. If
++.Dq no
++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
++on multi homed machines.
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
++and setting it to
++.Dq no
++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+ with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
+--- a/sshkey.c.old
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@
+          KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 },
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++        { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
+         { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00",
+          KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
+         { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00",
+--- a/sshkey.h.old
++++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
+         KEY_ED25519_CERT,
+         KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
+         KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
++        KEY_NULL,
+         KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+
</ins></span></pre>
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