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<title>[146143] trunk/dports/net/openssh</title>
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<dl class="meta">
<dt>Revision</dt> <dd><a href="https://trac.macports.org/changeset/146143">146143</a></dd>
<dt>Author</dt> <dd>ionic@macports.org</dd>
<dt>Date</dt> <dd>2016-02-29 20:09:39 -0800 (Mon, 29 Feb 2016)</dd>
</dl>
<h3>Log Message</h3>
<pre>openssh: update to 7.2p1. Rebase patches. Fixes: #50741.</pre>
<h3>Modified Paths</h3>
<ul>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshPortfile">trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile</a></li>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfiles0002Applekeychainintegrationotherchangespatch">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch</a></li>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfileslaunchdpatch">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/launchd.patch</a></li>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfilespampatch">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch</a></li>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfilespatchsshdcapplesandboxnamedexternaldiff">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff</a></li>
</ul>
<h3>Added Paths</h3>
<ul>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh72p1gsskexall20141021mp20160301patch">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-7.2p1-gsskex-all-20141021-mp-20160301.patch</a></li>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh72p1hpnssh14v5diff">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-7.2p1-hpnssh14v5.diff</a></li>
</ul>
<h3>Removed Paths</h3>
<ul>
<li><a href="#trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh67p1gsskexall20141021284f364patch">trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div id="patch">
<h3>Diff</h3>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshPortfile"></a>
<div class="modfile"><h4>Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile (146142 => 146143)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile 2016-03-01 03:34:02 UTC (rev 146142)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile 2016-03-01 04:09:39 UTC (rev 146143)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> PortSystem 1.0
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> name openssh
</span><del>-version 7.1p2
</del><ins>+version 7.2p1
+revision 0
</ins><span class="cx"> categories net
</span><span class="cx"> platforms darwin
</span><span class="cx"> maintainers nomaintainer
</span><span class="lines">@@ -27,8 +28,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> homepage http://www.openbsd.org/openssh/
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> checksums ${distfiles} \
</span><del>- rmd160 e0ca67e7b4d583e900b6d0700398f8b611a1103e \
- sha256 dd75f024dcf21e06a0d6421d582690bf987a1f6323e32ad6619392f3bfde6bbd
</del><ins>+ rmd160 8af707c17337f223d5cbd1c7510f73dde2b22ff5 \
+ sha256 973cc37b2f3597e4cf599b09e604e79c0fe5d9b6f595a24e91ed0662860b4ac3
</ins><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> master_sites openbsd:OpenSSH/portable \
</span><span class="cx"> ftp://ftp.cise.ufl.edu/pub/mirrors/openssh/portable/ \
</span><span class="lines">@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> variant gsskex conflicts hpn requires kerberos5 description "Add OpenSSH GSSAPI key exchange patch" {
</span><span class="cx"> use_autoreconf yes
</span><span class="cx"> patchfiles-append 0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch \
</span><del>- openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch
</del><ins>+ openssh-7.2p1-gsskex-all-20141021-mp-20160301.patch
</ins><span class="cx"> configure.cppflags-append \
</span><span class="cx"> -F/System/Library/Frameworks/DirectoryService.framework \
</span><span class="cx"> -F/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework \
</span></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfiles0002Applekeychainintegrationotherchangespatch"></a>
<div class="modfile"><h4>Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch (146142 => 146143)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch 2016-03-01 03:34:02 UTC (rev 146142)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch 2016-03-01 04:09:39 UTC (rev 146143)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
</span><del>---- a/Makefile.in 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/Makefile.in 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/Makefile.in 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/Makefile.in 2016-03-01 02:14:38.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SED=@SED@
</span><span class="cx"> ENT=@ENT@
</span><span class="cx"> XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
</span><span class="lines">@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> MANFMT=@MANFMT@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> @@ -112,6 +113,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
</span><del>- sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o
</del><ins>+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
+ sandbox-solaris.o
</ins><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> +KEYCHAINOBJS=keychain.o
</span><span class="cx"> +
</span><span class="lines">@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
</span><span class="cx"> $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
</span><span class="cx"> $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
</span><del>---- a/audit-bsm.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/audit-bsm.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/audit-bsm.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/audit-bsm.c 2016-03-01 02:14:38.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -263,7 +263,12 @@ bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string,
</span><span class="cx"> pid_t pid = getpid();
</span><span class="cx"> AuditInfoTermID tid = ssh_bsm_tid;
</span><span class="lines">@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
</span><span class="cx"> gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid;
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><del>---- a/auth-pam.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth-pam.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -793,10 +793,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
</del><ins>+--- a/auth-pam.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/auth-pam.c 2016-03-01 02:14:38.000000000 +0100
+@@ -794,10 +794,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
</ins><span class="cx"> free(msg);
</span><span class="cx"> return (0);
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="lines">@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> /* FALLTHROUGH */
</span><span class="cx"> default:
</span><span class="cx"> *num = 0;
</span><del>---- a/auth.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/auth.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/auth.c 2016-03-01 02:22:17.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
</span><span class="lines">@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
</span><span class="cx"> "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
</span><span class="cx"> return 0;
</span><del>---- a/authfd.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/authfd.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/authfd.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/authfd.c 2016-03-01 02:14:38.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -165,6 +165,29 @@ ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbu
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -136,11 +136,11 @@
</span><span class="cx"> * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
</span><span class="cx"> * obtained). The argument must have been returned by
</span><span class="cx"> * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
</span><del>---- a/authfd.h 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/authfd.h 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/authfd.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/authfd.h 2016-03-01 02:14:38.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshk
</span><span class="cx"> u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
</span><del>- const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
</del><ins>+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat);
</ins><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> +int
</span><span class="cx"> +ssh_add_from_keychain(int agent_fd);
</span><span class="lines">@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
</span><span class="cx"> #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
</span><span class="cx">
</span><del>---- a/config.h.in 2015-08-21 07:09:20.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/config.h.in 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/config.h.in 2016-02-28 01:19:09.000000000 +0100
++++ b/config.h.in 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -78,6 +78,18 @@
</span><span class="cx"> /* FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD */
</span><span class="cx"> #undef BROKEN_STRNVIS
</span><span class="lines">@@ -179,9 +179,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> /* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
</span><span class="cx"> #undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
</span><span class="cx">
</span><del>---- a/configure.ac 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/configure.ac 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -4866,10 +4866,40 @@ AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [
</del><ins>+--- a/configure.ac 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/configure.ac 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -4916,10 +4916,40 @@ AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [
</ins><span class="cx"> #endif
</span><span class="cx"> ])
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
</span><span class="cx"> TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
</span><span class="cx"> else
</span><del>---- a/groupaccess.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/groupaccess.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/groupaccess.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/groupaccess.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -34,38 +34,67 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #include <string.h>
</span><span class="cx"> #include <limits.h>
</span><span class="lines">@@ -332,8 +332,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> return 0;
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx">
</span><del>---- a/groupaccess.h 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/groupaccess.h 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/groupaccess.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/groupaccess.h 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #ifndef GROUPACCESS_H
</span><span class="cx"> #define GROUPACCESS_H
</span><span class="lines">@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> int ga_match_pattern_list(const char *);
</span><span class="cx"> void ga_free(void);
</span><span class="cx"> --- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
</span><del>-+++ b/keychain.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>++++ b/keychain.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
</span><span class="cx"> +/*
</span><span class="cx"> + * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> +
</span><span class="cx"> +}
</span><span class="cx"> --- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
</span><del>-+++ b/keychain.h 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>++++ b/keychain.h 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
</span><span class="cx"> +/*
</span><span class="cx"> + * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1088,9 +1088,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> +int add_identities_using_keychain(
</span><span class="cx"> + int (*add_identity)(const char *, const char *));
</span><span class="cx"> +char *keychain_read_passphrase(const char *filename, int oAskPassGUI);
</span><del>---- a/readconf.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -155,6 +155,9 @@ typedef enum {
</del><ins>+--- a/readconf.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/readconf.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ typedef enum {
</ins><span class="cx"> oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
</span><span class="cx"> oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
</span><span class="cx"> oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
</span><span class="cx"> oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
</span><span class="cx"> oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
</span><del>-@@ -278,6 +281,9 @@ static struct {
</del><ins>+@@ -281,6 +284,9 @@ static struct {
</ins><span class="cx"> { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
</span><span class="cx"> { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
</span><span class="cx"> { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> { NULL, oBadOption }
</span><span class="cx"> };
</span><del>-@@ -1391,6 +1397,12 @@ parse_keytypes:
</del><ins>+@@ -1433,6 +1439,12 @@ parse_keytypes:
</ins><span class="cx"> charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
</span><span class="cx"> goto parse_string;
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> case oProxyUseFdpass:
</span><span class="cx"> intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
</span><span class="cx"> goto parse_flag;
</span><del>-@@ -1667,6 +1679,9 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
</del><ins>+@@ -1715,6 +1727,9 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
</ins><span class="cx"> options->request_tty = -1;
</span><span class="cx"> options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
</span><span class="cx"> options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1;
</span><del>-@@ -1843,6 +1858,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
</del><ins>+@@ -1891,6 +1906,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
</ins><span class="cx"> options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
</span><span class="cx"> if (options->request_tty == -1)
</span><span class="cx"> options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1144,9 +1144,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
</span><span class="cx"> options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
</span><del>---- a/readconf.h 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.h 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -154,6 +154,10 @@ typedef struct {
</del><ins>+--- a/readconf.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/readconf.h 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -159,6 +159,10 @@ typedef struct {
</ins><span class="cx"> char *pubkey_key_types;
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1157,8 +1157,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> } Options;
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> #define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0
</span><del>---- a/scp.1 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/scp.1 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/scp.1 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/scp.1 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> .Sh SYNOPSIS
</span><span class="cx"> .Nm scp
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1177,8 +1177,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> .It Fl c Ar cipher
</span><span class="cx"> Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
</span><span class="cx"> This option is directly passed to
</span><del>---- a/scp.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/scp.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/scp.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/scp.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -78,6 +78,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
</span><span class="cx"> # include <sys/stat.h>
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> /* Server options. */
</span><span class="cx"> case 'd':
</span><span class="cx"> targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
</span><del>-@@ -506,7 +529,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -516,7 +539,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> remin = remout = -1;
</span><span class="cx"> do_cmd_pid = -1;
</span><span class="cx"> /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
</span><span class="cx"> iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
</span><span class="cx"> targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
</span><del>-@@ -752,6 +780,10 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -762,6 +790,10 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
</span><span class="cx"> char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX];
</span><span class="cx"> int len;
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
</span><span class="cx"> name = argv[indx];
</span><del>-@@ -759,12 +791,26 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -769,12 +801,26 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> len = strlen(name);
</span><span class="cx"> while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
</span><span class="cx"> name[--len] = '\0';
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1289,7 +1289,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
</span><span class="cx"> syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
</span><span class="cx"> goto next;
</span><del>-@@ -851,6 +897,36 @@ next: if (fd != -1) {
</del><ins>+@@ -861,6 +907,36 @@ next: if (fd != -1) {
</ins><span class="cx"> else
</span><span class="cx"> run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
</span><span class="cx"> (void) response();
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx">
</span><del>-@@ -942,6 +1018,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -952,6 +1028,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
</span><span class="cx"> targisdir = 1;
</span><span class="cx"> for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> cp = buf;
</span><span class="cx"> if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
</span><span class="cx"> return;
</span><del>-@@ -1087,10 +1167,51 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -1097,10 +1177,51 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> omode = mode;
</span><span class="cx"> mode |= S_IWUSR;
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1389,7 +1389,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
</span><span class="cx"> if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
</span><span class="cx"> (void) close(ofd);
</span><del>-@@ -1175,6 +1296,29 @@ bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(er
</del><ins>+@@ -1185,6 +1306,29 @@ bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(er
</ins><span class="cx"> wrerrno = errno;
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> (void) response();
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
</span><span class="cx"> setimes = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
</span><del>-@@ -1236,7 +1380,11 @@ void
</del><ins>+@@ -1246,7 +1390,11 @@ void
</ins><span class="cx"> usage(void)
</span><span class="cx"> {
</span><span class="cx"> (void) fprintf(stderr,
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1431,9 +1431,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n"
</span><span class="cx"> " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
</span><span class="cx"> exit(1);
</span><del>---- a/servconf.c 2015-10-24 21:56:23.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
</del><ins>+--- a/servconf.c 2016-03-01 02:14:29.000000000 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
</ins><span class="cx"> if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
</span><span class="cx"> options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> if (options->password_authentication == -1)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
</span><span class="cx"> options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
</span><del>-@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, i
</del><ins>+@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, i
</ins><span class="cx"> if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
</span><span class="cx"> debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
</span><span class="cx"> "not exist", line, user);
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1451,9 +1451,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
</span><span class="cx"> "at line %d", user, line);
</span><span class="cx"> } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
</span><del>---- a/session.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/session.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -2114,8 +2114,10 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
</del><ins>+--- a/session.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/session.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -2111,8 +2111,10 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
</ins><span class="cx"> n_bytes = packet_remaining();
</span><span class="cx"> tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> /* Set window size from the packet. */
</span><span class="cx"> pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
</span><del>-@@ -2355,9 +2357,11 @@ session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
</del><ins>+@@ -2352,9 +2354,11 @@ session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
</ins><span class="cx"> if (s->pid != 0)
</span><span class="cx"> record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1476,8 +1476,8 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> /*
</span><span class="cx"> * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
</span><del>---- a/ssh-add.0 2015-08-21 07:08:30.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-add.0 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/ssh-add.0 2016-02-28 01:18:35.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh-add.0 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME
</span><span class="cx"> ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the authentication agent
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1501,8 +1501,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> -s pkcs11
</span><span class="cx"> Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
</span><span class="cx">
</span><del>---- a/ssh-add.1 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-add.1 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/ssh-add.1 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh-add.1 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> .Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent
</span><span class="cx"> .Sh SYNOPSIS
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1526,8 +1526,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> .It Fl s Ar pkcs11
</span><span class="cx"> Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
</span><span class="cx"> .Ar pkcs11 .
</span><del>---- a/ssh-add.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-add.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/ssh-add.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh-add.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #include "misc.h"
</span><span class="cx"> #include "ssherr.h"
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1563,7 +1563,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
</span><span class="cx"> printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r));
</span><span class="cx"> return -1;
</span><del>-@@ -180,7 +194,7 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd)
</del><ins>+@@ -178,7 +192,7 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd)
</ins><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> static int
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> {
</span><span class="cx"> struct sshkey *private, *cert;
</span><span class="cx"> char *comment = NULL;
</span><del>-@@ -224,6 +238,10 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
</del><ins>+@@ -222,6 +236,10 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
</ins><span class="cx"> filename, ssh_err(r));
</span><span class="cx"> goto fail_load;
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1582,22 +1582,22 @@
</span><span class="cx"> +
</span><span class="cx"> /* try last */
</span><span class="cx"> if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
</span><del>- if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, filename,
-@@ -233,6 +251,8 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
</del><ins>+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private,
+@@ -230,6 +248,8 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
</ins><span class="cx"> filename, ssh_err(r));
</span><span class="cx"> goto fail_load;
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> + if (keychain && private != NULL)
</span><span class="cx"> + store_in_keychain(filename, pass);
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><del>- if (comment == NULL)
- comment = xstrdup(filename);
-@@ -246,8 +266,13 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
</del><ins>+ if (private == NULL) {
+ /* clear passphrase since it did not work */
+@@ -241,8 +261,13 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
</ins><span class="cx"> if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0)
</span><span class="cx"> goto fail_load;
</span><span class="cx"> if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass,
</span><del>-- filename, &private, NULL)) == 0)
-+ filename, &private, NULL)) == 0) {
</del><ins>+- &private, &comment)) == 0)
++ &private, &comment)) == 0) {
</ins><span class="cx"> + if (private != NULL) {
</span><span class="cx"> + if (keychain)
</span><span class="cx"> + store_in_keychain(filename, pass);
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1607,7 +1607,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
</span><span class="cx"> fprintf(stderr,
</span><span class="cx"> "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
</span><del>-@@ -444,13 +469,13 @@ lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
</del><ins>+@@ -440,13 +465,13 @@ lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
</ins><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> static int
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> return -1;
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> return 0;
</span><del>-@@ -473,6 +498,11 @@ usage(void)
</del><ins>+@@ -469,6 +494,11 @@ usage(void)
</ins><span class="cx"> fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n");
</span><span class="cx"> fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n");
</span><span class="cx"> fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n");
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1636,15 +1636,15 @@
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> int
</span><del>-@@ -484,6 +514,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -480,6 +510,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
</span><span class="cx"> int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> + int keychain = 0;
</span><span class="cx">
</span><ins>+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
</ins><span class="cx"> /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
</span><del>- sanitise_stdfd();
-@@ -510,7 +541,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -507,7 +538,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> exit(2);
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1653,7 +1653,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> switch (ch) {
</span><span class="cx"> case 'E':
</span><span class="cx"> fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
</span><del>-@@ -555,6 +586,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -552,6 +583,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> goto done;
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> break;
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1667,7 +1667,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> default:
</span><span class="cx"> usage();
</span><span class="cx"> ret = 1;
</span><del>-@@ -603,7 +641,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -600,7 +638,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> default_files[i]);
</span><span class="cx"> if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
</span><span class="cx"> continue;
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> ret = 1;
</span><span class="cx"> else
</span><span class="cx"> count++;
</span><del>-@@ -612,7 +650,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</del><ins>+@@ -609,7 +647,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
</ins><span class="cx"> ret = 1;
</span><span class="cx"> } else {
</span><span class="cx"> for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1685,8 +1685,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> argv[i]) == -1)
</span><span class="cx"> ret = 1;
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><del>---- a/ssh-agent.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c 2015-10-24 23:19:13.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/ssh-agent.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh-agent.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
</span><span class="cx"> # include <util.h>
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1712,7 +1712,7 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
</span><span class="cx"> #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
</span><del>-@@ -828,6 +834,61 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
</del><ins>+@@ -840,6 +846,61 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
</ins><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> /* dispatch incoming messages */
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> static void
</span><del>-@@ -922,6 +983,9 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
</del><ins>+@@ -934,6 +995,9 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
</ins><span class="cx"> process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
</span><span class="cx"> break;
</span><span class="cx"> #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1784,7 +1784,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> default:
</span><span class="cx"> /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
</span><span class="cx"> error("Unknown message %d", type);
</span><del>-@@ -1172,7 +1236,11 @@ usage(void)
</del><ins>+@@ -1184,7 +1248,11 @@ usage(void)
</ins><span class="cx"> int
</span><span class="cx"> main(int ac, char **av)
</span><span class="cx"> {
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
</span><span class="cx"> u_int nalloc;
</span><span class="cx"> char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
</span><del>-@@ -1207,7 +1275,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</del><ins>+@@ -1220,7 +1288,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</ins><span class="cx"> __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
</span><span class="cx"> seed_rng();
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1808,7 +1808,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> switch (ch) {
</span><span class="cx"> case 'E':
</span><span class="cx"> fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
</span><del>-@@ -1222,6 +1294,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</del><ins>+@@ -1235,6 +1307,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</ins><span class="cx"> case 'k':
</span><span class="cx"> k_flag++;
</span><span class="cx"> break;
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1820,7 +1820,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> case 's':
</span><span class="cx"> if (c_flag)
</span><span class="cx"> usage();
</span><del>-@@ -1253,7 +1330,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</del><ins>+@@ -1266,7 +1343,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</ins><span class="cx"> ac -= optind;
</span><span class="cx"> av += optind;
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1832,7 +1832,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> usage();
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
</span><del>-@@ -1309,6 +1390,53 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</del><ins>+@@ -1322,6 +1403,53 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</ins><span class="cx"> * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
</span><span class="cx"> * the parent.
</span><span class="cx"> */
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> prev_mask = umask(0177);
</span><span class="cx"> sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
</span><span class="cx"> if (sock < 0) {
</span><del>-@@ -1317,6 +1445,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</del><ins>+@@ -1330,6 +1458,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</ins><span class="cx"> cleanup_exit(1);
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> umask(prev_mask);
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1901,7 +1901,7 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> /*
</span><span class="cx"> * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
</span><del>-@@ -1393,6 +1529,7 @@ skip:
</del><ins>+@@ -1407,6 +1543,7 @@ skip:
</ins><span class="cx"> pkcs11_init(0);
</span><span class="cx"> #endif
</span><span class="cx"> new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1909,9 +1909,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> if (ac > 0)
</span><span class="cx"> parent_alive_interval = 10;
</span><span class="cx"> idtab_init();
</span><del>-@@ -1402,6 +1539,10 @@ skip:
- signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
- nalloc = 0;
</del><ins>+@@ -1420,6 +1557,10 @@ skip:
+ fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+ platform_pledge_agent();
</ins><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> +#ifdef KEYCHAIN
</span><span class="cx"> + process_add_from_keychain(NULL);
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1920,8 +1920,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> while (1) {
</span><span class="cx"> prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
</span><span class="cx"> result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
</span><del>---- a/ssh-keysign.8 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-keysign.8 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/ssh-keysign.8 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh-keysign.8 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ accessible to others.
</span><span class="cx"> Since they are readable only by root,
</span><span class="cx"> .Nm
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1932,8 +1932,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> .Pp
</span><span class="cx"> .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
</span><span class="cx"> .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
</span><del>---- a/sshconnect1.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect1.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/sshconnect1.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshconnect1.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #include "auth.h"
</span><span class="cx"> #include "digest.h"
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1953,8 +1953,8 @@
</span><span class="cx"> passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
</span><span class="cx"> if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
</span><span class="cx"> private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
</span><del>---- a/sshconnect2.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/sshconnect2.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshconnect2.c 2016-03-01 02:24:20.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #include "uidswap.h"
</span><span class="cx"> #include "hostfile.h"
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1963,20 +1963,20 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> #ifdef GSSAPI
</span><span class="cx"> #include "ssh-gss.h"
</span><del>-@@ -1136,6 +1137,10 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename, int u
</del><ins>+@@ -1215,6 +1216,10 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id)
</ins><span class="cx"> if (i == 0)
</span><span class="cx"> passphrase = "";
</span><span class="cx"> else {
</span><span class="cx"> +#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
</span><del>-+ passphrase = keychain_read_passphrase(filename, options.ask_pass_gui);
</del><ins>++ passphrase = keychain_read_passphrase(id->filename, options.ask_pass_gui);
</ins><span class="cx"> + if (passphrase == NULL)
</span><span class="cx"> +#endif
</span><span class="cx"> passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
</span><span class="cx"> if (*passphrase == '\0') {
</span><span class="cx"> debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
</span><del>---- a/sshd.0 2015-08-21 07:08:31.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.0 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -621,8 +621,7 @@ FILES
</del><ins>+--- a/sshd.0 2016-02-28 01:18:36.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd.0 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -651,8 +651,7 @@ FILES
</ins><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> SEE ALSO
</span><span class="cx"> scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1986,9 +1986,9 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> AUTHORS
</span><span class="cx"> OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
</span><del>---- a/sshd.8 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.8 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -953,10 +953,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
</del><ins>+--- a/sshd.8 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd.8 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -986,10 +986,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
</ins><span class="cx"> .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
</span><span class="cx"> .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
</span><span class="cx"> .Xr chroot 2 ,
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1999,9 +1999,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> .Xr sftp-server 8
</span><span class="cx"> .Sh AUTHORS
</span><span class="cx"> OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
</span><del>---- a/sshd.c 2015-10-24 21:56:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.c 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -2233,6 +2233,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</del><ins>+--- a/sshd.c 2016-03-01 02:14:34.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -2239,6 +2239,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</ins><span class="cx"> audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
</span><span class="cx"> #endif
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -2014,7 +2014,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> #ifdef GSSAPI
</span><span class="cx"> if (options.gss_authentication) {
</span><span class="cx"> temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
</span><del>-@@ -2240,12 +2246,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</del><ins>+@@ -2246,12 +2252,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
</ins><span class="cx"> restore_uid();
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> #endif
</span><span class="lines">@@ -2027,8 +2027,8 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> /*
</span><span class="cx"> * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
</span><del>---- a/sshd_config 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/sshd_config 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> # Logging
</span><span class="lines">@@ -2062,8 +2062,8 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> #AllowAgentForwarding yes
</span><span class="cx"> #AllowTcpForwarding yes
</span><del>---- a/sshd_config.0 2015-08-21 07:08:32.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.0 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/sshd_config.0 2016-02-28 01:18:36.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.0 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> PasswordAuthentication
</span><span class="lines">@@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> PermitEmptyPasswords
</span><span class="cx"> When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
</span><del>-@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
</del><ins>+@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
</ins><span class="cx"> either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
</span><span class="lines">@@ -2082,9 +2082,9 @@
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> UsePrivilegeSeparation
</span><span class="cx"> Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
</span><del>---- a/sshd_config.5 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.5 2015-10-24 21:56:30.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ are refused if the number of unauthentic
</del><ins>+--- a/sshd_config.5 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.5 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ are refused if the number of unauthentic
</ins><span class="cx"> .It Cm PasswordAuthentication
</span><span class="cx"> Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
</span><span class="cx"> The default is
</span><span class="lines">@@ -2093,7 +2093,7 @@
</span><span class="cx"> .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
</span><span class="cx"> When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
</span><span class="cx"> server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
</span><del>-@@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run
</del><ins>+@@ -1583,7 +1583,7 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run
</ins><span class="cx"> .Xr sshd 8
</span><span class="cx"> as a non-root user.
</span><span class="cx"> The default is
</span></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfileslaunchdpatch"></a>
<div class="modfile"><h4>Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/launchd.patch (146142 => 146143)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/launchd.patch 2016-03-01 03:34:02 UTC (rev 146142)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/launchd.patch 2016-03-01 04:09:39 UTC (rev 146143)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
</span><del>---- a/channels.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/channels.c 2015-10-24 04:37:00.000000000 +0200
</del><ins>+--- a/channels.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/channels.c 2016-03-01 00:35:58.000000000 +0100
</ins><span class="cx"> @@ -4037,15 +4037,35 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
</span><span class="cx"> * connection to the real X server.
</span><span class="cx"> */
</span><span class="lines">@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@
</span><span class="cx"> }
</span><span class="cx"> #endif
</span><span class="cx"> /*
</span><del>---- a/clientloop.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/clientloop.c 2015-10-24 04:37:00.000000000 +0200
-@@ -315,6 +315,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
</del><ins>+--- a/clientloop.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/clientloop.c 2016-03-01 00:49:24.000000000 +0100
+@@ -313,6 +313,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
</ins><span class="cx"> struct stat st;
</span><span class="cx"> u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
</span><span class="cx">
</span><span class="lines">@@ -53,13 +53,13 @@
</span><span class="cx"> + int is_path_to_socket = 0;
</span><span class="cx"> +#endif /* __APPLE__ */
</span><span class="cx"> +
</span><del>- xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
</del><span class="cx"> *_proto = proto;
</span><span class="cx"> *_data = data;
</span><del>-@@ -330,6 +334,33 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
- debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
- return;
- }
</del><ins>+ proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
+@@ -329,6 +333,34 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
+ }
+
+ if (xauth_path != NULL) {
</ins><span class="cx"> +#if __APPLE__
</span><span class="cx"> + {
</span><span class="cx"> + /*
</span><span class="lines">@@ -87,10 +87,11 @@
</span><span class="cx"> + }
</span><span class="cx"> + }
</span><span class="cx"> +#endif /* __APPLE__ */
</span><ins>++
</ins><span class="cx"> /*
</span><span class="cx"> * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
</span><span class="cx"> * not match an authorization entry. For this we
</span><del>-@@ -421,6 +452,9 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
</del><ins>+@@ -438,6 +470,9 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
</ins><span class="cx"> if (!got_data) {
</span><span class="cx"> u_int32_t rnd = 0;
</span><span class="cx">
</span></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh67p1gsskexall20141021284f364patch"></a>
<div class="delfile"><h4>Deleted: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch (146142 => 146143)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch 2016-03-01 03:34:02 UTC (rev 146142)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch 2016-03-01 04:09:39 UTC (rev 146143)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1,3033 +0,0 @@
</span><del>-From 1c1b6fa17982eb622e2c4e8f4a279f2113f57413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
-Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
-Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
-
-This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
-in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
-years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
-just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
-like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
-particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
-system resources."
-
-However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
-have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
--krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
-security history.
-
-Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
-Last-Updated: 2014-10-07
-
-Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
-
-
-Updated by: Mihai Moldovan <ionic@macports.org>
-Patch-Name: openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch
-Abstract: Updated for OpenSSH 7.1p1 with MacPorts patches for integration
- with Apple's launchd, pam, sandbox and KeyChain.
- WARNING: the commit ID does NOT match this patch. It is merely
- provided for reference.
-Last-Updated: 2015-10-24
-X-Ref: http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/openssh.git/tree/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch?id=2feb7b59e2ffab2b5cde0d6d2b2af33515b30ee2
----
- ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
- Makefile.in | 3 +-
- auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
- auth2-gss.c | 48 +++++++-
- auth2.c | 2 +
- clientloop.c | 13 +++
- config.h.in | 6 +
- configure | 57 ++++++++++
- configure.ac | 24 ++++
- gss-genr.c | 275 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
- gss-serv.c | 221 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- kex.c | 16 +++
- kex.h | 14 +++
- kexgssc.c | 332 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- kexgsss.c | 290 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- monitor.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++-
- monitor.h | 3 +
- monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
- monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
- readconf.c | 42 +++++++
- readconf.h | 5 +
- servconf.c | 38 ++++++-
- servconf.h | 3 +
- ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
- ssh_config | 2 +
- ssh_config.5 | 34 +++++-
- sshconnect2.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++-
- sshd.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++
- sshd_config | 2 +
- sshd_config.5 | 28 +++++
- sshkey.c | 3 +-
- sshkey.h | 1 +
- 33 files changed, 2052 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
- create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
- create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
-
---- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
-+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+20110101
-+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
-+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
-+
-+20100308
-+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
-+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
-+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
-+ Watson.
-+ -
-+
-+20100124
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
-+ Colin Watson
-+
-+20090615
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
-+ sshd.c ]
-+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
-+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
-+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
-+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
-+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
-+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
-+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
-+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
-+ Cast data.length before printing
-+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
-+
-+20090201
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
-+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
-+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
-+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
-+
-+20080404
-+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
-+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
-+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
-+ Stoichkov
-+
-+20070317
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
-+ function
-+
-+20061220
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
-+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
-+
-+20060910
-+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
-+ ssh-gss.h ]
-+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
-+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
-+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
-+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
-+ <Bugzilla #928>
-+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
-+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
-+ configuration files
-+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
-+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
-+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
-+
-+20060909
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
-+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
-+ only, where they belong
-+ <Bugzilla #1225>
-+
-+20060829
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
-+ variable
-+
-+20060828
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
-+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
-+
-+20060818
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
-+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
-+
-+20060421
-+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
-+ fix compiler errors/warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
-+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
-+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
-+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
---- a/Makefile.in 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/Makefile.in 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
- kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
- kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
-- kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o
-+ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
-+ kexgssc.o
-
- SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
-@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
- auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
- auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
-- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
- loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
---- a/auth-krb5.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -183,8 +183,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
-
- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
- authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
-+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -241,15 +246,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-+ int ret, oerrno;
- char ccname[40];
- mode_t old_umask;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
-+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
-+ int tmpfd;
-+#endif
-
- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+ cctemplate, geteuid());
- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
- return ENOMEM;
-
-+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- oerrno = errno;
-@@ -266,6 +278,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_c
- return oerrno;
- }
- close(tmpfd);
-+#endif
-
- return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }
---- a/auth2-gss.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c 2015-10-24 08:43:51.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -54,6 +54,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complet
- static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
- /*
-+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
-+ */
-+static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ int authenticated = 0;
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-+ mic.length = len;
-+
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ free(mic.value);
-+
-+ return (authenticated);
-+}
-+
-+/*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
- */
-@@ -238,7 +272,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-@@ -274,7 +309,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
- if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated =
-+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
- else
- logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
-@@ -290,6 +326,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- return 0;
- }
-
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+ "gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ &options.gss_authentication
-+};
-+
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- "gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
---- a/auth2.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth2.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
-
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- &method_none,
- &method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ &method_gsskeyex,
- &method_gssapi,
- #endif
- &method_passwd,
---- a/clientloop.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/clientloop.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
-
-@@ -1644,6 +1648,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha
- /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
- if (!rekeying) {
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
-+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
-+ need_rekeying = 1;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
- debug("need rekeying");
- active_state->kex->done = 0;
---- a/config.h.in 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/config.h.in 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1635,6 +1635,9 @@
- /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
- #undef USE_BTMP
-
-+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
-+#undef USE_CCAPI
-+
- /* Use libedit for sftp */
- #undef USE_LIBEDIT
-
-@@ -1650,6 +1653,9 @@
- /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
- #undef USE_PIPES
-
-+/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
-+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+
- /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
- #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
-
---- a/configure.ac 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/configure.ac 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -625,6 +625,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
- [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
-+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
-+ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
-+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
-+ [cc_context_t c;
-+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
-+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
-+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
-+ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
-+ fi],
-+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
-+ )
- m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
- AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
- AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
---- a/gss-genr.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/gss-genr.c 2015-10-24 08:56:32.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.23 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -41,12 +41,167 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-+typedef struct {
-+ char *encoded;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
-+
-+/*
-+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
-+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
-+ */
-+
-+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
-+
-+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
-+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
-+ *
-+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
-+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
-+ */
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
-+ OM_uint32 min_status;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-+ host, client));
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-+ const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ Buffer buf;
-+ size_t i;
-+ int oidpos, enclen;
-+ char *mechs, *encoded;
-+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+ char deroid[2];
-+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
-+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
-+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
-+ free(gss_enc2oid);
-+ }
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
-+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
-+
-+ buffer_init(&buf);
-+
-+ oidpos = 0;
-+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
-+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
-+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
-+
-+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
-+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
-+
-+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
-+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+
-+ if (oidpos != 0)
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
-+ oidpos++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-+
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
-+
-+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_free(&buf);
-+
-+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
-+ free(mechs);
-+ mechs = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (mechs);
-+}
-+
-+gss_OID
-+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ switch (kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ }
-+
-+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
-+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
-+ i++;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
-+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
-+
-+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
-+}
-+
- /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -199,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de
- }
-
- ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
-+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
- 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
-
-@@ -229,8 +384,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con
- }
-
- OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_name_t gssname;
-+ OM_uint32 status;
-+ gss_OID_set oidset;
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
-+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
-+
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
-+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
-+
-+ if (!ctx->major)
-+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+
-+ if (ctx->major)
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+
-+ return(ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- {
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -238,6 +427,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+/* Priviledged when used by server */
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+{
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
- void
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- const char *context)
-@@ -251,11 +453,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha
- }
-
- int
--ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
-+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
-+ const char *client)
- {
- gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
-+
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ ctx = &intctx;
-
- /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
-@@ -265,6 +472,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
-+
- if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
- NULL);
-@@ -274,10 +485,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
- GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- }
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-
- return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
-+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
-+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ static gss_name_t name;
-+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
-+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
-+ int equal;
-+
-+ now = time(NULL);
-+
-+ if (ctxt) {
-+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
-+
-+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
-+ saved_lifetime+= now;
-+ } else {
-+ /* Handle the error */
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (now - last_call < 10)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ last_call = now;
-+
-+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
-+ return 0;
-+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
-+ return 1;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c 2015-10-24 09:08:09.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- krb5_error_code problem;
- krb5_principal princ;
- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-- int len;
- const char *errmsg;
-+ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
-
- if (client->creds == NULL) {
- debug("No credentials stored");
-@@ -181,11 +181,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
- return;
- }
-
-- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
-+ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
-+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-+
- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
-- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
-- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = NULL;
-+#else
-+ if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
-+ new_ccname++;
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
-+ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
-+ char *p;
-+ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
-+ if (p)
-+ *p = '\0';
-+ }
-+ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
-+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -194,9 +209,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
-
- krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-
-+ client->store.data = krb_context;
-+
- return;
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
-+ char *name = NULL;
-+ krb5_error_code problem;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
-+ &principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
-+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
-+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+
-+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+
-+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
-+ ccache))) {
-+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
- "Kerberos",
-@@ -204,7 +286,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
- NULL,
-- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
- };
-
- #endif /* KRB5 */
---- a/gss-serv.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/gss-serv.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -45,17 +45,20 @@
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
- extern ServerOptions options;
-
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
-+ {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
-
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -142,6 +145,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss
- }
-
- /* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
-+ gss_OID_set supported;
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
-+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-+ NULL, NULL));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
-+ const char *dummy) {
-+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+ int res;
-+
-+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+ return (res);
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- {
-@@ -151,7 +177,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o
- gss_OID_set supported;
-
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
-+ return;
-
- while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -277,8 +305,48 @@ OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- int i = 0;
-+ int equal = 0;
-+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
-+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-
-- gss_buffer_desc ename;
-+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
-+ new_name, &equal);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!equal) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
-+ client->name = new_name;
-+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+ client->updated = 1;
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-
- client->mech = NULL;
-
-@@ -293,6 +361,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
- if (client->mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
-+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
-+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- &client->displayname, NULL))) {
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -310,6 +385,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+
- /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -320,11 +397,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
- void
- ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- {
-- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
-- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
-- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
-- gssapi_client.store.filename);
-- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
-+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+ krb5_error_code problem;
-+
-+ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
-+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
-+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
-+ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
-+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
-+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
-+ } else {
-+ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
-+ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
-+ }
- }
- }
-
-@@ -357,7 +443,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
-
- /* Privileged */
- int
--ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- OM_uint32 lmin;
-
-@@ -367,9 +453,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- return 0;
- }
- if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
-- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
-+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
-+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
-+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
- return 1;
-- else {
-+ } else {
- /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -383,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- return (0);
- }
-
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
-+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
-+ *
-+ * In the child, we want to :
-+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
-+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
-+ */
-+
-+/* Stuff for PAM */
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
-+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
- {
-- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-+}
-+#endif
-
-- return (ctx->major);
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
-+ int ok;
-+ int ret;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
-+ char *envstr;
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-+
-+ if (!ok)
-+ return;
-+
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
-+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
-+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
-+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
-+ */
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ if (!use_privsep) {
-+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
-+ &pamconv, &pamh);
-+ if (ret)
-+ return;
-+
-+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
-+ if (!ret)
-+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
-+ int ok = 0;
-+
-+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
-+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
-+
-+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
-+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
-+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
-+ else
-+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
-+
-+ restore_uid();
-+
-+ return ok;
- }
-
- #endif
---- a/kex.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/kex.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
- # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
- # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
-@@ -97,6 +101,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
- #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
- { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
- };
-+static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+#endif
-+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
-+};
-
- char *
- kex_alg_list(char sep)
-@@ -129,6 +141,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
- if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- return k;
- }
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
-+ return k;
-+ }
-+#endif
- return NULL;
- }
-
---- a/kex.h 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/kex.h 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ enum kex_exchange {
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
- KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
- KEX_C25519_SHA256,
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
-+#endif
- KEX_MAX
- };
-
-@@ -139,6 +144,12 @@ struct kex {
- u_int flags;
- int hash_alg;
- int ec_nid;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ int gss_deleg_creds;
-+ int gss_trust_dns;
-+ char *gss_host;
-+ char *gss_client;
-+#endif
- char *client_version_string;
- char *server_version_string;
- char *failed_choice;
-@@ -187,6 +198,11 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
- int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
- int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
-+int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
-+#endif
-+
- int kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
- const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
---- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
-+++ b/kexgssc.c 2015-10-24 09:15:13.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+int
-+kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
-+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+ u_char *kbuf;
-+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
-+ u_char *empty = "";
-+ char *msg;
-+ char *lang;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ int first = 1;
-+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+ size_t hashlen;
-+
-+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
-+
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_client &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
-+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ packet_put_int(min);
-+ packet_put_int(nbits);
-+ packet_put_int(max);
-+
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+
-+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
-+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-+
-+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
-+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
-+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+
-+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+ &ret_flags);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+ free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+ */
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ if (first) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ first = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+ do {
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+ serverhostkey =
-+ packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ }
-+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+ switch (type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
-+
-+ /* Is there a token included? */
-+ if (packet_get_char()) {
-+ recv_tok.value =
-+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+ } else {
-+ /* No token included */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+ debug("Received Error");
-+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
-+ min_status = packet_get_int();
-+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+ } else {
-+ /* No data, and not complete */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+ */
-+
-+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-+
-+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-+ if ((int)kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ free(kbuf);
-+
-+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
-+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
-+ shared_secret, /* K */
-+ hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->hash_alg,
-+ kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ dh_server_pub,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+ free(msg_tok.value);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ free(serverhostkey);
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+
-+ /* save session id */
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
---- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
-+++ b/kexgsss.c 2015-10-24 09:22:08.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
-+int
-+kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
-+{
-+ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+ int r = 0;
-+
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+ */
-+
-+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+ u_int slen, klen, kout;
-+ u_char *kbuf;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+ char *mechs;
-+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+ size_t hashlen;
-+
-+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
-+
-+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
-+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
-+ * into life
-+ */
-+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
-+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) {
-+ free(mechs);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
-+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
-+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange");
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ min = packet_get_int();
-+ nbits = packet_get_int();
-+ max = packet_get_int();
-+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, nbits, max);
-+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-+ if (dh == NULL)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_write_wait();
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ switch(type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+
-+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect(
-+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+
-+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+ free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ }
-+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-+
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-+ if ((int)kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ free(kbuf);
-+
-+ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash(
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
-+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
-+ hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->hash_alg,
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh_client_pub,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
-+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
-+
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ } else {
-+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-+
-+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+ * just exchanged. */
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+ return r;
-+}
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
---- a/monitor.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/monitor.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -234,11 +236,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
- #endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
-+#endif
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- #endif
-@@ -353,6 +362,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
-@@ -461,6 +474,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-@@ -1864,6 +1881,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p
- # endif
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
- kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
-@@ -1963,6 +1987,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- goid.length = len;
-
-@@ -1990,6 +2017,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
- OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- in.length = len;
- major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
-@@ -2007,6 +2037,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
- }
- return (0);
- }
-@@ -2018,6 +2049,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer
- OM_uint32 ret;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- gssbuf.length = len;
- mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-@@ -2044,7 +2078,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
- {
- int authenticated;
-
-- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-@@ -2057,5 +2095,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
- /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc data;
-+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ data.length = len;
-+ if (data.length != 20)
-+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
-+ (int) data.length);
-+
-+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
-+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
-+ session_id2_len = data.length;
-+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
-+ }
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-+
-+ free(data.value);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
-+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-+
-+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-+
-+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+
-+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
-+
-+ free(store.filename);
-+ free(store.envvar);
-+ free(store.envval);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
-+
-+ return(0);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
---- a/monitor.h 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/monitor.h 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
-
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
-+
- };
-
- struct mm_master;
---- a/monitor_wrap.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
- }
-
- int
--mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- Buffer m;
- int authenticated = 0;
-@@ -1085,5 +1085,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ OM_uint32 major;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+
-+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-+ hash->length = len;
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return(major);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+
-+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return (ok);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
---- a/monitor_wrap.h 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
- gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
--int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
---- a/readconf.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ typedef enum {
- oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
-+ oGssServerIdentity,
- oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -195,10 +197,19 @@ static struct {
- { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
-+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- { "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -900,10 +911,30 @@ parse_time:
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oGssDelegateCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssTrustDns:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case oGssClientIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssServerIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oBatchMode:
- intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1613,7 +1644,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- options->gss_authentication = -1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
-+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
-+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1744,8 +1780,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
---- a/readconf.h 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.h 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
- int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
-+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
-+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
-+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
- int password_authentication; /* Try password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
---- a/servconf.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.c 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -117,8 +117,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
- options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -275,10 +277,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
- if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
- options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 0;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -412,6 +418,7 @@ typedef enum {
- sHostKeyAlgorithms,
- sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
- sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -486,11 +493,17 @@ static struct {
- { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1231,6 +1244,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sGssCleanupCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1239,6 +1256,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssStoreRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sPasswordAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2246,7 +2267,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
- #endif
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
---- a/servconf.h 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.h 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -118,8 +118,10 @@ typedef struct {
- int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
- * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
- int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
-+ int gss_store_rekey;
- int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
---- a/ssh-gss.h 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h 2015-10-24 09:39:38.000000000 +0200
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
-
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
-
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
-+
- typedef struct {
- char *filename;
- char *envvar;
- char *envval;
-+ struct passwd *owner;
- void *data;
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
-
-@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
- gss_buffer_desc displayname;
- gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
- gss_cred_id_t creds;
-+ gss_name_t name;
- struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
- ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int used;
-+ int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
-
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
- void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
-
- typedef struct {
-@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
- gss_OID oid; /* client */
- gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
- gss_name_t client; /* server */
-- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
-+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
- } Gssctxt;
-
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
-
- int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
--int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
-+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
-
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
--int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
-+
-+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
-+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
---- a/ssh_config 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh_config 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- # HostbasedAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
- # BatchMode no
- # CheckHostIP yes
- # AddressFamily any
---- a/ssh_config.5 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh_config.5 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -749,11 +749,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
-+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
-+identity will be used.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
-+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
-+hostname.
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
--Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
-+If set to
-+.Dq yes
-+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
-+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
-+credentials to a session on the server.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
-+Set to
-+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
-+the name of the host being connected to. If
-+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
-+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
---- a/sshconnect2.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c 2015-10-24 08:30:26.000000000 +0200
-@@ -161,9 +161,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- struct kex *kex;
- int r;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
-+ char *gss_host = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_host = host;
- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+ orig = options.kex_algorithms;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = host;
-+
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
-+ if (gss) {
-+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+ xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
-+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
- options.kex_algorithms);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-@@ -194,6 +219,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
- }
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+ "%s,null", orig);
-+ free(gss);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
-@@ -212,10 +248,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- # endif
- #endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
-+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
-+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ } else {
-+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
-
- if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) {
-@@ -307,6 +363,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32
- int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
- #endif
-
- void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-@@ -322,6 +379,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
-
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {"gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ NULL,
-+ &options.gss_authentication,
-+ NULL},
- {"gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
- NULL,
-@@ -628,19 +690,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
- static u_int mech = 0;
- OM_uint32 min;
- int ok = 0;
-+ const char *gss_host;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
-+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
-
- /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
- * once. */
-
- if (gss_supported == NULL)
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
-+ gss_supported = NULL;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-
- /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
- while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
- /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
-- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
-+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
-+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
- ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
- } else {
- mech++;
-@@ -737,8 +811,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_
- {
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-- int oidlen;
-- char *oidv;
-+ u_int oidlen;
-+ u_char *oidv;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-@@ -851,6 +925,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
- free(lang);
- return 0;
- }
-+
-+int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 ms;
-+
-+ static int attempt = 0;
-+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
-+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- int
---- a/sshd.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.c 2015-10-24 09:36:22.000000000 +0200
-@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@
- #include "version.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifndef O_NOCTTY
- #define O_NOCTTY 0
- #endif
-@@ -969,8 +973,9 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
- }
- debug3("%s: sent %d hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
- if (nkeys == 0)
-- fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
-- packet_send();
-+ debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
-+ else
-+ packet_send();
- sshbuf_free(buf);
- }
-
-@@ -1834,10 +1839,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- }
-+#ifndef GSSAPI
-+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- }
-+#endif
- if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- exit(1);
-@@ -2152,6 +2160,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port());
- free(laddr);
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+ /*
-+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
-+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
-+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
-+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
-+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
-+ *
-+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
-+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
-+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
-+ * same session (bad).
-+ *
-+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
-+ * automatically.
-+ *
-+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
-+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
-+ */
-+ {
-+ OSStatus err = 0;
-+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
-+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+
-+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
-+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
-+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
-+ else {
-+ debug("Creating new security session...");
-+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
-+ &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /*
- * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2570,6 +2632,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- list_hostkey_types());
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {
-+ char *orig;
-+ char *gss = NULL;
-+ char *newstr = NULL;
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+ * the other key exchange algorithms
-+ */
-+
-+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+ orig = NULL;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_keyex)
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+ else
-+ gss = NULL;
-+
-+ if (gss && orig)
-+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ else if (gss)
-+ newstr = gss;
-+ else if (orig)
-+ newstr = orig;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+ * host key algorithm we support
-+ */
-+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+ if (newstr)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+ else
-+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /* start key exchange */
- if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
- fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
-@@ -2584,6 +2688,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- # endif
- #endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
---- a/sshd_config 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config 2015-10-24 08:11:41.000000000 +0200
-@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
---- a/sshd_config.5 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.5 2015-10-24 08:11:42.000000000 +0200
-@@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
-+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
-@@ -642,6 +648,11 @@ machine's default store.
- This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
-+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
-+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
-+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
-+.Dq no .
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
- as a comma-separated pattern list.
---- a/sshkey.c 2015-10-24 08:11:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.c 2015-10-24 08:11:42.000000000 +0200
-@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] =
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
- { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 }
- };
-
-@@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_o
- const struct keytype *kt;
-
- for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
-- if (kt->name == NULL)
-+ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
- continue;
- if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
- continue;
---- a/sshkey.h 2015-10-24 08:11:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.h 2015-10-24 08:32:46.000000000 +0200
-@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
- KEY_DSA_CERT,
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
- KEY_ED25519_CERT,
-+ KEY_NULL,
- KEY_UNSPEC
- };
-
---- a/auth.c 2015-10-24 07:49:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth.c 2015-10-24 09:42:00.000000000 +0200
-@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
- case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
- if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
- strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
-+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0 ||
- strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
- return 1;
- break;
</del></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh72p1gsskexall20141021mp20160301patchfromrev146119trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh67p1gsskexall20141021284f364patch"></a>
<div class="copfile"><h4>Copied: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-7.2p1-gsskex-all-20141021-mp-20160301.patch (from rev 146119, trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch) (0 => 146143)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-7.2p1-gsskex-all-20141021-mp-20160301.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-7.2p1-gsskex-all-20141021-mp-20160301.patch 2016-03-01 04:09:39 UTC (rev 146143)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -0,0 +1,3021 @@
</span><ins>+From 1c1b6fa17982eb622e2c4e8f4a279f2113f57413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Wilkinson <simon@sxw.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
+Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
+
+This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
+in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
+years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
+just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
+like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
+particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
+system resources."
+
+However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
+have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
+-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
+security history.
+
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
+Last-Updated: 2014-10-07
+
+Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
+
+
+Updated by: Mihai Moldovan <ionic@macports.org>
+Patch-Name: openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch
+Abstract: Updated for OpenSSH 7.2p1 with MacPorts patches for integration
+ with Apple's launchd, pam, sandbox and KeyChain.
+ WARNING: the commit ID does NOT match this patch. It is merely
+ provided for reference.
+Last-Updated: 2016-03-01
+X-Ref: http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/rpms/openssh.git/tree/openssh-7.2p1-gsskex.patch?id=13073f8d9ccec27646453f729aaa2952ae86ad01
+X-Ref: http://sources.debian.net/data/main/o/openssh/1:7.1p2-2/debian/patches/gssapi.patch (N.B.: original patch still references 7.1p2 - no newer version available currently)
+---
+ ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
+ Makefile.in | 3 +-
+ auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
+ auth2-gss.c | 48 +++++++-
+ auth2.c | 2 +
+ clientloop.c | 13 +++
+ config.h.in | 6 +
+ configure | 57 ++++++++++
+ configure.ac | 24 ++++
+ gss-genr.c | 275 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
+ gss-serv.c | 221 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ kex.c | 16 +++
+ kex.h | 14 +++
+ kexgssc.c | 332 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kexgsss.c | 290 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++-
+ monitor.h | 3 +
+ monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
+ monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
+ readconf.c | 42 +++++++
+ readconf.h | 5 +
+ servconf.c | 38 ++++++-
+ servconf.h | 3 +
+ ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
+ ssh_config | 2 +
+ ssh_config.5 | 34 +++++-
+ sshconnect2.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config | 2 +
+ sshd_config.5 | 28 +++++
+ sshkey.c | 3 +-
+ sshkey.h | 1 +
+ 33 files changed, 2052 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
+ create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
+ create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
+
+--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++20110101
++ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
++ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
++
++20100308
++ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
++ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
++ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
++ Watson.
++ -
++
++20100124
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
++ Colin Watson
++
++20090615
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++ sshd.c ]
++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++ Cast data.length before printing
++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++ - [ gss-serv.c ]
++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++ Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
++ function
++
++20061220
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++ ssh-gss.h ]
++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++ <Bugzilla #928>
++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++ configuration files
++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++ only, where they belong
++ <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
++ variable
++
++20060828
++ - [ gss-genr.c ]
++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
++ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++ fix compiler errors/warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ fix uninitialized variable warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ gssgenr.c ]
++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Bugzilla #1220 >
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+--- a/Makefile.in 2016-03-01 02:14:38.000000000 +0100
++++ b/Makefile.in 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
+ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
+- platform-pledge.o
++ platform-pledge.o kexgssc.o
+
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
+@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
+ auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+--- a/auth-krb5.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/auth-krb5.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -183,8 +183,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+
+ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -241,15 +246,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
++ int ret, oerrno;
+ char ccname[40];
+ mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++ int tmpfd;
++#endif
+
+ ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++ cctemplate, geteuid());
+ if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ return ENOMEM;
+
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ oerrno = errno;
+@@ -266,6 +278,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_c
+ return oerrno;
+ }
+ close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+
+ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+--- a/auth2-gss.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/auth2-gss.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -54,6 +54,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complet
+ static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
+ /*
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ int authenticated = 0;
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++ u_int len;
++
++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++ mic.length = len;
++
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++ &gssbuf, &mic))))
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ free(mic.value);
++
++ return (authenticated);
++}
++
++/*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+ */
+@@ -238,7 +272,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -274,7 +309,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated =
++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ else
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+@@ -290,6 +326,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++ "gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ &options.gss_authentication
++};
++
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ "gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+--- a/auth2.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/auth2.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ &method_none,
+ &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ &method_gsskeyex,
+ &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ &method_passwd,
+--- a/clientloop.c 2016-03-01 02:14:25.000000000 +0100
++++ b/clientloop.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -114,6 +114,10 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+
+@@ -1697,9 +1701,18 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha
+ break;
+
+ /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
++ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) {
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++ need_rekeying = 1;
++ }
++#endif
++ }
++
+ /* Buffer input from the connection. */
+ client_process_net_input(readset);
+
+--- a/config.h.in 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
++++ b/config.h.in 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1653,6 +1653,9 @@
+ /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+ #undef USE_BTMP
+
++/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
++#undef USE_CCAPI
++
+ /* Use libedit for sftp */
+ #undef USE_LIBEDIT
+
+@@ -1671,6 +1674,9 @@
+ /* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
+ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+
++/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
++#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++
+ /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
+ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+--- a/configure.ac 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
++++ b/configure.ac 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -632,6 +632,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++ [cc_context_t c;
++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
++ fi],
++ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
++ )
+ m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+ AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+ AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+--- a/gss-genr.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/gss-genr.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.23 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -41,12 +41,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
++typedef struct {
++ char *encoded;
++ gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++ OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
++ return NULL;
++
++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++ host, client));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++ const char *host, const char *client) {
++ Buffer buf;
++ size_t i;
++ int oidpos, enclen;
++ char *mechs, *encoded;
++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++ char deroid[2];
++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++ EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++ free(gss_enc2oid);
++ }
++
++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++ (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++ buffer_init(&buf);
++
++ oidpos = 0;
++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++
++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++ if (oidpos != 0)
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++ oidpos++;
++ }
++ }
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_free(&buf);
++
++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++ free(mechs);
++ mechs = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++ int i = 0;
++
++ switch (kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ default:
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ }
++
++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++ i++;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -199,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de
+ }
+
+ ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+ 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+@@ -229,8 +384,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con
+ }
+
+ OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_name_t gssname;
++ OM_uint32 status;
++ gss_OID_set oidset;
++
++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
++
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
++
++ if (!ctx->major)
++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++
++ if (ctx->major)
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++
++ return(ctx->major);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -238,6 +427,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++ return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ const char *context)
+@@ -251,11 +453,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha
+ }
+
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
++ const char *client)
+ {
+ gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ ctx = &intctx;
+
+ /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -265,6 +472,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
++
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+ NULL);
+@@ -274,10 +485,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+ return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ static gss_name_t name;
++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
++ int equal;
++
++ now = time(NULL);
++
++ if (ctxt) {
++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
++
++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
++ saved_lifetime+= now;
++ } else {
++ /* Handle the error */
++ }
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (now - last_call < 10)
++ return 0;
++
++ last_call = now;
++
++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
++ return 0;
++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ krb5_principal princ;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+- int len;
+ const char *errmsg;
++ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
+
+ if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -181,11 +181,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ return;
+ }
+
+- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
++ new_ccname++;
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
++ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
++ char *p;
++ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
++ if (p)
++ *p = '\0';
++ }
++ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -194,9 +209,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+
++ client->store.data = krb_context;
++
+ return;
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
++ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
++ char *name = NULL;
++ krb5_error_code problem;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
++ &principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++
++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++
++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++
++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
++ ccache))) {
++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ "Kerberos",
+@@ -204,7 +286,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ NULL,
+- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+--- a/gss-serv.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/gss-serv.c 2016-03-01 03:36:06.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -45,17 +45,20 @@
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
++ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -142,6 +145,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss
+ }
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
++ gss_OID_set supported;
++
++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
++ NULL, NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++ const char *dummy) {
++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++ int res;
++
++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++ return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -151,7 +177,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o
+ gss_OID_set supported;
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++ return;
+
+ while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -277,8 +305,48 @@ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
++ int equal = 0;
++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
+
+- gss_buffer_desc ename;
++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
++ new_name, &equal);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if (!equal) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++ client->name = new_name;
++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++ client->updated = 1;
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
+
+ client->mech = NULL;
+
+@@ -293,6 +361,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ if (client->mech == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
++ if (ctx->client_creds &&
++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -310,6 +385,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+ /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -320,11 +397,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ {
+- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
+- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
+- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+- gssapi_client.store.filename);
+- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++ krb5_error_code problem;
++
++ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
++ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
++ } else {
++ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
++ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -357,7 +443,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
+
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+@@ -367,9 +453,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++ gssapi_client.used = 1;
++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+ return 1;
+- else {
++ } else {
+ /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -383,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+
+- return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
++ int ok;
++ int ret;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++ char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++
++ if (!ok)
++ return;
++
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++ */
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ if (!use_privsep) {
++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++ return;
++ }
++
++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++ &pamconv, &pamh);
++ if (ret)
++ return;
++
++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
++ gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++ if (!ret)
++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++ int ok = 0;
++
++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
++ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++ return 0;
++
++ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++ else
++ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++ restore_uid();
++
++ return ok;
+ }
+
+ #endif
+--- a/kex.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/kex.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -109,6 +113,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
++static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++#endif
++ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
++};
+
+ char *
+ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -141,6 +153,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ return k;
+ }
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
++ return k;
++ }
++#endif
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+--- a/kex.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/kex.h 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -92,6 +92,11 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+ KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+ KEX_C25519_SHA256,
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
++#endif
+ KEX_MAX
+ };
+
+@@ -140,6 +145,12 @@ struct kex {
+ u_int flags;
+ int hash_alg;
+ int ec_nid;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ int gss_deleg_creds;
++ int gss_trust_dns;
++ char *gss_host;
++ char *gss_client;
++#endif
+ char *client_version_string;
+ char *server_version_string;
+ char *failed_choice;
+@@ -190,6 +201,11 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
+ int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
+ int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
++int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
++#endif
++
+ int kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ b/kexgssc.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++int
++kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
++ DH *dh;
++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++ u_char *kbuf;
++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++ u_char *empty = "";
++ char *msg;
++ char *lang;
++ int type = 0;
++ int first = 1;
++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++ size_t hashlen;
++
++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
++ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++ if (kex->gss_client &&
++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ packet_put_int(min);
++ packet_put_int(nbits);
++ packet_put_int(max);
++
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(p);
++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(g);
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++
++ do {
++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++ &ret_flags);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++ }
++
++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++ free(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity check failed");
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++ */
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ if (first) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ first = 0;
++ } else {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++ do {
++ type = packet_read();
++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++ serverhostkey =
++ packet_get_string(&slen);
++ }
++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++ switch (type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ msg_tok.length = strlen;
++
++ /* Is there a token included? */
++ if (packet_get_char()) {
++ recv_tok.value =
++ packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++ } else {
++ /* No token included */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++ }
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++ debug("Received Error");
++ maj_status = packet_get_int();
++ min_status = packet_get_int();
++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++ } else {
++ /* No data, and not complete */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ /*
++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
++ */
++
++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++ if ((int)kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ free(kbuf);
++
++ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ dh->pub_key, /* e */
++ dh_server_pub, /* f */
++ shared_secret, /* K */
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->hash_alg,
++ kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ dh_server_pub,
++ shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++ free(msg_tok.value);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ free(serverhostkey);
++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++ /* save session id */
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ b/kexgsss.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++int
++kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++ int r = 0;
++
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ /*
++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
++ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++ */
++
++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++ u_int slen, klen, kout;
++ u_char *kbuf;
++ DH *dh;
++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++ int type = 0;
++ gss_OID oid;
++ char *mechs;
++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++ size_t hashlen;
++
++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++ * into life
++ */
++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) {
++ free(mechs);
++ }
++ }
++
++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange");
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ min = packet_get_int();
++ nbits = packet_get_int();
++ max = packet_get_int();
++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
++ packet_check_eom();
++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, nbits, max);
++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++ if (dh == NULL)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_write_wait();
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ do {
++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++ type = packet_read();
++ switch(type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++
++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++ break;
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect(
++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++
++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++ free(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("No client public key");
++
++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ }
++ fatal("accept_ctx died");
++ }
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++ if ((int)kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ free(kbuf);
++
++ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash(
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->hash_alg,
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
++ NULL, 0,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh_client_pub,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ } else {
++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++ }
++ packet_send();
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++
++ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++ * just exchanged. */
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++ return r;
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+--- a/monitor.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/monitor.c 2016-03-01 03:43:58.000000000 +0100
+@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -233,11 +235,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
++#endif
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ #endif
+@@ -352,6 +361,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+@@ -460,6 +473,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1861,6 +1878,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p
+ # endif
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+@@ -1960,6 +1984,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ goid.length = len;
+
+@@ -1987,6 +2014,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
+ OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ in.length = len;
+ major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+@@ -2004,6 +2034,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+ }
+@@ -2015,6 +2046,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ gssbuf.length = len;
+ mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -2041,7 +2075,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
+ {
+ int authenticated;
+
+- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -2054,5 +2092,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc data;
++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 major, minor;
++ u_int len;
++
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ data.length = len;
++ if (data.length != 20)
++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
++ (int) data.length);
++
++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++ session_id2_len = data.length;
++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++ }
++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++ free(data.value);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, major);
++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++
++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int ok;
++
++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++
++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
++
++ free(store.filename);
++ free(store.envvar);
++ free(store.envval);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
++
++ return(0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+--- a/monitor.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/monitor.h 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
++
+ };
+
+ struct mm_master;
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
+ }
+
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1085,5 +1085,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ OM_uint32 major;
++ u_int len;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++ hash->length = len;
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ int ok;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++
++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return (ok);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+--- a/readconf.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
++++ b/readconf.c 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
++ oGssServerIdentity,
+ oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -196,10 +198,19 @@ static struct {
+ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -932,10 +943,30 @@ parse_time:
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssTrustDns:
++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oGssClientIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssServerIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssRenewalRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1660,7 +1691,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication = -1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1792,8 +1828,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+--- a/readconf.h 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
++++ b/readconf.h 2016-03-01 02:26:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+--- a/servconf.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c 2016-03-01 03:46:29.000000000 +0100
+@@ -117,8 +117,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication=-1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -287,10 +289,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+- options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -419,6 +425,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -493,11 +500,17 @@ static struct {
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1242,6 +1255,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1250,6 +1267,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssStoreRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2265,7 +2286,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+--- a/servconf.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/servconf.h 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -118,8 +118,10 @@ typedef struct {
+ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
++ int gss_store_rekey;
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+--- a/ssh-gss.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh-gss.h 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
+
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+ char *filename;
+ char *envvar;
+ char *envval;
++ struct passwd *owner;
+ void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+
+@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ gss_cred_id_t creds;
++ gss_name_t name;
+ struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int used;
++ int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+ void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ gss_OID oid; /* client */
+ gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
+ gss_name_t client; /* server */
+- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++ const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
++void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+--- a/ssh_config 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh_config 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ # HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++# GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ # BatchMode no
+ # CheckHostIP yes
+ # AddressFamily any
+--- a/ssh_config.5 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh_config.5 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -826,10 +826,43 @@ The default is
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
++identity will be used.
++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
++hostname.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++If set to
++.Dq yes
++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
++credentials to a session on the server.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+--- a/sshconnect2.c 2016-03-01 02:24:20.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshconnect2.c 2016-03-01 04:15:58.000000000 +0100
+@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++ char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
+@@ -196,6 +201,33 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
+ }
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = host;
++
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++ if (gss) {
++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++
++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++ "%s,null", orig);
++ free(gss);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
+ (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+@@ -214,10 +246,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
++ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++ } else {
++ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
+
+ /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
+@@ -312,6 +364,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32
+ int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+
+ void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -327,6 +380,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ {"gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ NULL,
++ &options.gss_authentication,
++ NULL},
+ {"gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+@@ -657,19 +715,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ static u_int mech = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min;
+ int ok = 0;
++ const char *gss_host;
++
++ if (options.gss_server_identity)
++ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = authctxt->host;
+
+ /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ * once. */
+
+ if (gss_supported == NULL)
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
++ gss_supported = NULL;
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
++ options.gss_client_identity)) {
+ ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ } else {
+ mech++;
+@@ -766,8 +836,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_
+ {
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+- int oidlen;
+- char *oidv;
++ u_int oidlen;
++ u_char *oidv;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -880,6 +950,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
+ free(lang);
+ return 0;
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 ms;
++
++ static int attempt = 0;
++ if (attempt++ >= 1)
++ return (0);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++ packet_send();
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++ return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ int
+--- a/sshd.c 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd.c 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef O_NOCTTY
+ #define O_NOCTTY 0
+ #endif
+@@ -974,8 +978,9 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+ }
+ debug3("%s: sent %d hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+- fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+- packet_send();
++ debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
++ else
++ packet_send();
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ }
+
+@@ -1840,10 +1845,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ }
++#ifndef GSSAPI
++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ }
++#endif
+ if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ exit(1);
+@@ -2158,6 +2166,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port());
+ free(laddr);
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++ /*
++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
++ *
++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
++ * same session (bad).
++ *
++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
++ * automatically.
++ *
++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
++ */
++ {
++ OSStatus err = 0;
++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++
++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
++ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
++ else {
++ debug("Creating new security session...");
++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
++ &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2578,6 +2640,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+ list_hostkey_types());
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {
++ char *orig;
++ char *gss = NULL;
++ char *newstr = NULL;
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ /*
++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++ * the other key exchange algorithms
++ */
++
++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++ orig = NULL;
++
++ if (options.gss_keyex)
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++ else
++ gss = NULL;
++
++ if (gss && orig)
++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ else if (gss)
++ newstr = gss;
++ else if (orig)
++ newstr = orig;
++
++ /*
++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++ * host key algorithm we support
++ */
++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++ if (newstr)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++ else
++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* start key exchange */
+ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+@@ -2592,6 +2696,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+--- a/sshd_config 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+--- a/sshd_config.5 2016-03-01 02:14:39.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.5 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -623,6 +623,12 @@ The default is
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+@@ -643,6 +649,11 @@ machine's default store.
+ This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a comma-separated pattern list.
+--- a/sshkey.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshkey.c 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] =
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
+ };
+
+--- a/sshkey.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshkey.h 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+ KEY_DSA_CERT,
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+ KEY_ED25519_CERT,
++ KEY_NULL,
+ KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+
+--- a/auth.c 2016-03-01 02:22:17.000000000 +0100
++++ b/auth.c 2016-03-01 02:26:26.000000000 +0100
+@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
+ case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+ if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
++ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+ return 1;
+ break;
</ins></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfilesopenssh72p1hpnssh14v5diff"></a>
<div class="addfile"><h4>Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-7.2p1-hpnssh14v5.diff (0 => 146143)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-7.2p1-hpnssh14v5.diff (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-7.2p1-hpnssh14v5.diff 2016-03-01 04:09:39 UTC (rev 146143)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -0,0 +1,1284 @@
</span><ins>+--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ b/HPN-README 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++Notes:
++
++MULTI-THREADED CIPHER:
++The AES cipher in CTR mode has been multithreaded (MTR-AES-CTR). This will allow ssh installations
++on hosts with multiple cores to use more than one processing core during encryption.
++Tests have show significant throughput performance increases when using MTR-AES-CTR up
++to and including a full gigabit per second on quad core systems. It should be possible to
++achieve full line rate on dual core systems but OS and data management overhead makes this
++more difficult to achieve. The cipher stream from MTR-AES-CTR is entirely compatible with single
++thread AES-CTR (ST-AES-CTR) implementations and should be 100% backward compatible. Optimal
++performance requires the MTR-AES-CTR mode be enabled on both ends of the connection.
++The MTR-AES-CTR replaces ST-AES-CTR and is used in exactly the same way with the same
++nomenclature.
++Use examples: ssh -caes128-ctr you@host.com
++ scp -oCipher=aes256-ctr file you@host.com:~/file
++
++NONE CIPHER:
++To use the NONE option you must have the NoneEnabled switch set on the server and
++you *must* have *both* NoneEnabled and NoneSwitch set to yes on the client. The NONE
++feature works with ALL ssh subsystems (as far as we can tell) *AS LONG AS* a tty is not
++spawned. If a user uses the -T switch to prevent a tty being created the NONE cipher will
++be disabled.
++
++The performance increase will only be as good as the network and TCP stack tuning
++on the receiver side of the connection allows. As a rule of thumb a user will need
++at least 10Mb/s connection with a 100ms RTT to see a doubling of performance. The
++HPN-SSH home page describes this in greater detail.
++
++http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh
++
++BUFFER SIZES:
++
++If HPN is disabled the receive buffer size will be set to the
++OpenSSH default of 64K.
++
++If an HPN system connects to a nonHPN system the receive buffer will
++be set to the HPNBufferSize value. The default is 2MB but user adjustable.
++
++If an HPN to HPN connection is established a number of different things might
++happen based on the user options and conditions.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = up to 64MB
++This is the default state. The HPN buffer size will grow to a maximum of 64MB
++as the TCP receive buffer grows. The maximum HPN Buffer size of 64MB is
++geared towards 10GigE transcontinental connections.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = TCP receive buffer value.
++Users on non-autotuning systesm should disable TCPRcvBufPoll in the
++ssh_cofig and sshd_config
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCP receive buffer and HPNBufferSize.
++This would be the system defined TCP receive buffer (RWIN).
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
++Generally there is no need to set both.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = grows to HPNBufferSize
++The buffer will grow up to the maximum size specified here.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
++Generally there is no need to set both of these, especially on autotuning
++systems. However, if the users wishes to override the autotuning this would be
++one way to do it.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = TCPRcvBuf.
++This will override autotuning and set the TCP recieve buffer to the user defined
++value.
++
++
++HPN Specific Configuration options
++
++TcpRcvBuf=[int]KB client
++ set the TCP socket receive buffer to n Kilobytes. It can be set up to the
++maximum socket size allowed by the system. This is useful in situations where
++the tcp receive window is set low but the maximum buffer size is set
++higher (as is typical). This works on a per TCP connection basis. You can also
++use this to artifically limit the transfer rate of the connection. In these
++cases the throughput will be no more than n/RTT. The minimum buffer size is 1KB.
++Default is the current system wide tcp receive buffer size.
++
++TcpRcvBufPoll=[yes/no] client/server
++ enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life
++of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled
++for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista)
++default is yes.
++
++NoneEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
++ enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used
++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However,
++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted
++even if this option is enabled. Set to no by default.
++
++NoneSwitch=[yes/no] client
++ Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after
++authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client
++and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE
++cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an
++error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly
++have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in
++interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to no by default.
++
++HPNDisabled=[yes/no] client/server
++ In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact
++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is
++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to no.
++
++HPNBufferSize=[int]KB client/server
++ This is the default buffer size the HPN functionality uses when interacting
++with nonHPN SSH installations. Conceptually this is similar to the TcpRcvBuf
++option as applied to the internal SSH flow control. This value can range from
++1KB to 64MB (1-65536). Use of oversized or undersized buffers can cause performance
++problems depending on the length of the network path. The default size of this buffer
++is 2MB.
++
++
++Credits: This patch was conceived, designed, and led by Chris Rapier (rapier@psc.edu)
++ The majority of the actual coding for versions up to HPN12v1 was performed
++ by Michael Stevens (mstevens@andrew.cmu.edu). The MT-AES-CTR cipher was
++ implemented by Ben Bennet (ben@psc.edu) and improved by Mike Tasota
++ (tasota@gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013.
++ This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National
++ Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation.
+--- a/channels.c 2016-03-01 04:32:11.000000000 +0100
++++ b/channels.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -186,6 +186,12 @@ static void port_open_helper(Channel *c,
+ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
+ static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
+
++
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++static int hpn_disabled = 0;
++static int hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
++#endif
++
+ /* -- channel core */
+
+ Channel *
+@@ -336,6 +342,9 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int r
+ c->local_window_max = window;
+ c->local_consumed = 0;
+ c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ c->dynamic_window = 0;
++#endif
+ c->remote_id = -1;
+ c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
+ c->remote_window = 0;
+@@ -840,11 +849,41 @@ channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++static u_int
++channel_tcpwinsz(void)
++{
++ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0;
++ socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz);
++ int ret = -1;
++
++ /* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */
++ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
++ return (128*1024);
++ ret = getsockopt(packet_get_connection_in(),
++ SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz);
++ /* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX */
++ if (ret == 0 && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
++ tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
++ debug2("tcpwinsz: %d for connection: %d", tcpwinsz,
++ packet_get_connection_in());
++ return (tcpwinsz);
++}
++#endif
++
+ static void
+ channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+ {
+ u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize();
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* check buffer limits */
++ if (!c->tcpwinsz || c->dynamic_window > 0)
++ c->tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz();
++
++ limit = MIN(limit, 2 * c->tcpwinsz);
++#endif
++
+ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
+ limit > 0 &&
+ buffer_len(&c->input) < limit &&
+@@ -1862,6 +1901,20 @@ channel_check_window(Channel *c)
+ c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
+ c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
+ c->local_consumed > 0) {
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment */
++ if (c->dynamic_window && (c->tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) {
++ u_int addition = 0;
++
++ /*
++ * grow the window somewhat aggressively to maintain
++ * pressure
++ */
++ addition = 1.5*(c->tcpwinsz - c->local_window_max);
++ c->local_window_max += addition;
++ c->local_consumed += addition;
++ }
++#endif
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_consumed);
+@@ -2813,6 +2866,17 @@ channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen
+ return addr;
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++void
++channel_set_hpn(int external_hpn_disabled, int external_hpn_buffer_size)
++{
++ hpn_disabled = external_hpn_disabled;
++ hpn_buffer_size = external_hpn_buffer_size;
++ debug("HPN Disabled: %d, HPN Buffer Size: %d", hpn_disabled,
++ hpn_buffer_size);
++}
++#endif
++
+ static int
+ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd,
+ int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+@@ -2941,6 +3005,17 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int typ
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /*
++ * explicitly test for hpn disabled option. if true use smaller
++ * window size.
++ */
++ if (!hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
++ hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
++ 0, "port listener", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "port listener", 1);
+@@ -3975,6 +4050,14 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
+ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ sock = socks[n];
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!hpn_disabled)
++ nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
++ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
++ hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
++ 0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+--- a/channels.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/channels.h 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ struct Channel {
+ u_int local_maxpacket;
+ int extended_usage;
+ int single_connection;
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ int dynamic_window;
++ u_int tcpwinsz;
++#endif
+
+ char *ctype; /* type */
+
+@@ -312,4 +316,9 @@ void chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *);
+ void chan_write_failed(Channel *);
+ void chan_obuf_empty(Channel *);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++/* hpn handler */
++void channel_set_hpn(int, int);
++#endif
++
+ #endif
+--- a/cipher.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/cipher.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -244,7 +244,13 @@ ciphers_valid(const char *names)
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
+ c = cipher_by_name(p);
+- if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
++ if (c == NULL || (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2 &&
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ c->number != SSH_CIPHER_NONE
++#else
++ 1
++#endif
++ )) {
+ free(cipher_list);
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -544,6 +550,9 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c
+
+ switch (c->number) {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
++#endif
+ case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+@@ -592,6 +601,9 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c
+
+ switch (c->number) {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
++#endif
+ case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+--- a/clientloop.c 2016-03-01 04:32:11.000000000 +0100
++++ b/clientloop.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1995,6 +1995,15 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_t
+ sock = x11_connect_display();
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return NULL;
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* again is this really necessary for X11? */
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("x11",
++ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
++ options.hpn_buffer_size,
++ CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("x11",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
+@@ -2020,6 +2029,14 @@ client_request_agent(const char *request
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
++ SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
++ options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
++ "authentication agent connection", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
+@@ -2050,6 +2067,12 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
++ options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ c->datagram = 1;
+--- a/compat.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/compat.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -210,6 +210,14 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
+ debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* Check to see if the remote side is OpenSSH and not HPN */
++ if (strstr(version,"OpenSSH") != NULL &&
++ strstr(version,"hpn") == NULL) {
++ datafellows |= SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW;
++ debug("Remote is NON-HPN aware");
++ }
++#endif
+ return check[i].bugs;
+ }
+ }
+--- a/compat.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/compat.h 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++#define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW 0x80000000
++#endif
+
+ void enable_compat13(void);
+ void enable_compat20(void);
+--- a/configure.ac 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/configure.ac 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -4321,6 +4321,25 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([maildir],
+ ]
+ ) # maildir
+
++#check whether user wants HPN support
++HPN_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(hpn,
++ [ --with-hpn Enable HPN support],
++ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++ AC_DEFINE(HPN_ENABLED,1,[Define if you want HPN support.])
++ HPN_MSG="yes"
++ fi ]
++)
++#check whether user wants NONECIPHER support
++NONECIPHER_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(nonecipher,
++ [ --with-nonecipher Enable NONECIPHER support],
++ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++ AC_DEFINE(NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED,1,[Define if you want NONECIPHER support.])
++ NONECIPHER_MSG="yes"
++ fi ]
++)
++
+ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test])
+ disable_ptmx_check=yes
+@@ -4989,6 +5008,8 @@ echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack
+ echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+ echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+ echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
++echo " HPN support: $HPN_MSG"
++echo " NONECIPHER support: $NONECIPHER_MSG"
+
+ echo ""
+
+--- a/kex.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/kex.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -822,6 +822,20 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ peer[ncomp] = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name);
++ if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) {
++ int auth_flag;
++
++ auth_flag = ssh_packet_authentication_state(ssh);
++ debug("Requesting NONE. Authflag is %d", auth_flag);
++ if (auth_flag == 1) {
++ debug("None requested post authentication.");
++ } else {
++ fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed.");
++ }
++ }
++#endif
+ debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
+ ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+ newkeys->enc.name,
+--- a/packet.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/packet.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1037,6 +1037,24 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
++int rekey_requested = 0;
++void
++packet_request_rekeying(void)
++{
++ rekey_requested = 1;
++}
++
++int
++ssh_packet_authentication_state(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
++
++ return(state->after_authentication);
++}
++#endif
++
+ #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
+ static int
+ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+@@ -1055,6 +1073,12 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh
+ /* Peer can't rekey */
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+ return 0;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ if (rekey_requested == 1) {
++ rekey_requested = 0;
++ return 1;
++ }
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
+--- a/packet.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/packet.h 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -185,6 +185,11 @@ int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh,
+ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh);
+ const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp);
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++void packet_request_rekeying(void);
++int ssh_packet_authentication_state(struct ssh *ssh);
++#endif
++
+ /* OLD API */
+ extern struct ssh *active_state;
+ #include "opacket.h"
+--- a/readconf.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/readconf.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -154,6 +154,12 @@ typedef enum {
+ oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+ oVisualHostKey,
+ oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize, oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf,
++#endif
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ oNoneSwitch, oNoneEnabled,
++#endif
+ oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
+ oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
+ oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+@@ -280,6 +286,16 @@ static struct {
+ { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
+ { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
+ { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ { "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
++ { "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ { "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
++ { "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
++ { "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
++ { "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
++#endif
+ { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
+
+ { NULL, oBadOption }
+@@ -938,6 +954,44 @@ parse_time:
+ intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ case oHPNDisabled:
++ intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oHPNBufferSize:
++ intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
++ goto parse_int;
++
++ case oTcpRcvBufPoll:
++ intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oTcpRcvBuf:
++ intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf;
++ goto parse_int;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ case oNoneEnabled:
++ intptr = &options->none_enabled;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ /* we check to see if the command comes from the */
++ /* command line or not. If it does then enable it */
++ /* otherwise fail. NONE should never be a default configuration */
++ case oNoneSwitch:
++ if(strcmp(filename,"command-line") == 0) {
++ intptr = &options->none_switch;
++ goto parse_flag;
++ } else {
++ error("NoneSwitch is found in %.200s.\nYou may only use this configuration option from the command line", filename);
++ error("Continuing...");
++ debug("NoneSwitch directive found in %.200s.", filename);
++ return 0;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+ intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+@@ -1713,6 +1767,16 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ options->request_tty = -1;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ options->none_switch = -1;
++ options->none_enabled = -1;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options->hpn_disabled = -1;
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
++#endif
+ options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
+ options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
+ options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
+@@ -1867,6 +1931,35 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+ if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+ options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ if (options->none_switch == -1)
++ options->none_switch = 0;
++ if (options->none_enabled == -1)
++ options->none_enabled = 0;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
++ options->hpn_disabled = 0;
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size > -1) {
++ /* if a user tries to set the size to 0 set it to 1KB */
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
++ /* limit the buffer to 64MB */
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size > 64*1024) {
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = 64*1024*1024;
++ debug("User requested buffer larger than 64MB. Request"
++ " reverted to 64MB");
++ } else
++ options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
++ debug("hpn_buffer_size set to %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
++ }
++ if (options->tcp_rcv_buf == 0)
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf = 1;
++ if (options->tcp_rcv_buf > -1)
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf *=1024;
++ if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1)
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1;
++#endif
+ if (options->control_master == -1)
+ options->control_master = 0;
+ if (options->control_persist == -1) {
+--- a/readconf.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/readconf.h 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -112,6 +112,16 @@ typedef struct {
+ int clear_forwardings;
+
+ int enable_ssh_keysign;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ int none_switch; /* Use none cipher */
++ int none_enabled; /* Allow none to be used */
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ int tcp_rcv_buf; /* user switch to set tcp recv buffer */
++ int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* Option to poll recv buf every window transfer */
++ int hpn_disabled; /* Switch to disable HPN buffer management */
++ int hpn_buffer_size; /* User definable size for HPN buffer window */
++#endif
+ int64_t rekey_limit;
+ int rekey_interval;
+ int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+--- a/scp.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/scp.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
+ off_t i, statbytes;
+ size_t amt, nr;
+ int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
+- char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX];
++ char *last, *name, buf[16384], encname[PATH_MAX];
+ int len;
+
+ for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
+@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ off_t size, statbytes;
+ unsigned long long ull;
+ int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+- char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
++ char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[16384];
+ struct timeval tv[2];
+
+ #define atime tv[0]
+--- a/servconf.c 2016-03-01 04:32:13.000000000 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -165,6 +165,14 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+ options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
+ options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ options->none_enabled = -1;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
++ options->hpn_disabled = -1;
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
++#endif
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ options->version_addendum = NULL;
+@@ -341,6 +349,57 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ }
+ if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+ options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ if (options->none_enabled == -1)
++ options->none_enabled = 0;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
++ options->hpn_disabled = 0;
++
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size == -1) {
++ /*
++ * option not explicitly set. Now we have to figure out
++ * what value to use.
++ */
++ if (options->hpn_disabled == 1) {
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++ } else {
++ int sock, socksize;
++ socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++
++ /*
++ * get the current RCV size and set it to that
++ * create a socket but don't connect it
++ * we use that the get the rcv socket size
++ */
++ sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++ getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ close(sock);
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++ debug ("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
++ }
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * we have to do this incase the user sets both values in a
++ * contradictory manner. hpn_disabled overrrides
++ * hpn_buffer_size
++ */
++ if (options->hpn_disabled <= 0) {
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
++ /* limit the maximum buffer to 64MB */
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size > 64*1024) {
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = 64*1024*1024;
++ } else {
++ options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
++ }
++ } else
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
+ if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+@@ -425,6 +484,12 @@ typedef enum {
+ sHostCertificate,
+ sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ sNoneEnabled,
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
++#endif
+ sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+ sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+ sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
+@@ -560,6 +625,14 @@ static struct {
+ { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ { "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ { "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++ { "hpnbuffersize", sHPNBufferSize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++ { "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll, SSHCFG_ALL },
++#endif
+ { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -1180,6 +1253,25 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ case sNoneEnabled:
++ intptr = &options->none_enabled;
++ goto parse_flag;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ case sTcpRcvBufPoll:
++ intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case sHPNDisabled:
++ intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case sHPNBufferSize:
++ intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
++ goto parse_int;
++#endif
++
+ case sRhostsRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+--- a/servconf.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/servconf.h 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -173,6 +173,15 @@ typedef struct {
+
+ int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ int none_enabled; /* enable NONE cipher switch */
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/
++ int hpn_disabled; /* disable hpn functionality. false by default */
++ int hpn_buffer_size; /* set the hpn buffer size - default 3MB */
++#endif
++
+ int permit_tun;
+
+ int num_permitted_opens;
+--- a/serverloop.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/serverloop.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1041,6 +1041,12 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ sock = tun_open(tun, mode);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ goto done;
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
++ options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ c->datagram = 1;
+@@ -1078,6 +1084,10 @@ server_request_session(void)
+ c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
+ -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "server-session", 1);
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll && !options.hpn_disabled)
++ c->dynamic_window = 1;
++#endif
+ if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
+ debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
+ channel_free(c);
+--- a/session.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/session.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -2326,6 +2326,14 @@ session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, in
+ */
+ if (s->chanid == -1)
+ fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
++ fdout, fdin, fderr,
++ ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
++ 1, is_tty, options.hpn_buffer_size);
++ else
++#endif
+ channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
+ fdout, fdin, fderr,
+ ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
+--- a/sftp.1 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sftp.1 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -264,7 +264,8 @@ diagnostic messages from
+ Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+ Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
+ but will increase memory usage.
+-The default is 64 outstanding requests.
++The default is 256 outstanding requests providing for 8MB
++of outstanding data with a 32KB buffer.
+ .It Fl r
+ Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
+ Note that
+--- a/sftp.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sftp.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -71,7 +71,11 @@ typedef void EditLine;
+ #include "sftp-client.h"
+
+ #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 256 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
++#else
+ #define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
++#endif
+
+ /* File to read commands from */
+ FILE* infile;
+--- a/ssh.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/ssh.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -898,6 +898,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ /*
++ * ensure that the user doesn't try to backdoor a
++ * null cipher switch on an interactive session
++ * so explicitly disable it no matter what.
++ */
++ options.none_switch = 0;
++#endif
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ line = xstrdup(optarg);
+@@ -1851,9 +1859,85 @@ ssh_session2_open(void)
+ if (!isatty(err))
+ set_nonblock(err);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /*
++ * we need to check to see if what they want to do about buffer
++ * sizes here. In a hpn to nonhpn connection we want to limit
++ * the window size to something reasonable in case the far side
++ * has the large window bug. In hpn to hpn connection we want to
++ * use the max window size but allow the user to override it
++ * lastly if they disabled hpn then use the ssh std window size
++
++ * so why don't we just do a getsockopt() here and set the
++ * ssh window to that? In the case of a autotuning receive
++ * window the window would get stuck at the initial buffer
++ * size generally less than 96k. Therefore we need to set the
++ * maximum ssh window size to the maximum hpn buffer size
++ * unless the user has specifically set the tcprcvbufpoll
++ * to no. In which case we *can* just set the window to the
++ * minimum of the hpn buffer size and tcp receive buffer size
++ */
++
++ if (tty_flag)
++ options.hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++ else
++ options.hpn_buffer_size = 2*1024*1024;
++
++ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW) {
++ debug("HPN to Non-HPN Connection");
++ } else {
++ int sock, socksize;
++ socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll <= 0) {
++ sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++ getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ close(sock);
++ debug("socksize %d", socksize);
++ options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++ debug ("HPNBufferSize set to TCP RWIN: %d",
++ options.hpn_buffer_size);
++ } else {
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0) {
++ /*
++ * create a socket but don't connect it.
++ * we use that the get the rcv socket size
++ */
++ sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++ /*
++ * if they are using the tcp_rcv_buf option
++ * attempt to set the buffer size to that
++ */
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf)
++ setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ (void *)&options.tcp_rcv_buf,
++ sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf));
++ getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ close(sock);
++ debug("socksize %d", socksize);
++ options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++ debug ("HPNBufferSize set to user TCPRcvBuf: "
++ "%d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
++ debug("Final hpn_buffer_size = %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++
++ window = options.hpn_buffer_size;
++
++ channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
++#else
+ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++#endif
++
+ packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ if (tty_flag) {
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++#endif
+ window >>= 1;
+ packetmax >>= 1;
+ }
+@@ -1862,6 +1946,12 @@ ssh_session2_open(void)
+ window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+ "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll > 0 && !options.hpn_disabled) {
++ c->dynamic_window = 1;
++ debug ("Enabled Dynamic Window Scaling");
++ }
++#endif
+ debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self);
+
+ channel_send_open(c->self);
+--- a/sshconnect.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshconnect.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -267,6 +267,31 @@ ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
+ kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++/*
++ * Set TCP receive buffer if requested.
++ * Note: tuning needs to happen after the socket is
++ * created but before the connection happens
++ * so winscale is negotiated properly -cjr
++ */
++static void
++ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(int sock)
++{
++ void *buf = (void *)&options.tcp_rcv_buf;
++ int sz = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf);
++ int socksize;
++ socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++
++ debug("setsockopt Attempting to set SO_RCVBUF to %d", options.tcp_rcv_buf);
++ if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, buf, sz) >= 0) {
++ getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ debug("setsockopt SO_RCVBUF: %.100s %d", strerror(errno), socksize);
++ } else
++ error("Couldn't set socket receive buffer to %d: %.100s",
++ options.tcp_rcv_buf, strerror(errno));
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
+ */
+@@ -283,6 +308,11 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct
+ }
+ fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0)
++ ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(sock);
++#endif
++
+ /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+ if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged)
+ return sock;
+@@ -526,11 +556,23 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, i
+ {
+ /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+ if (compat20) {
+- xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
++ xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s\r\n",
++ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options.hpn_disabled ? "" : SSH_HPN
++#else
++ ""
++#endif
++ );
+ } else {
+- xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
++ xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s\n",
++ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION,
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options.hpn_disabled ? "" : SSH_HPN
++#else
++ ""
++#endif
++ );
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
+ strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
+--- a/sshconnect2.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshconnect2.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,14 @@
+ extern char *client_version_string;
+ extern char *server_version_string;
+ extern Options options;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++struct kex *xxx_kex;
++
++/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
++/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
++
++extern int tty_flag;
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * SSH2 key exchange
+@@ -153,14 +161,17 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
+ return ret;
+ }
+
++static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
++static const char *myproposal_default[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ void
+ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ {
+- char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ char *s;
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
++ memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
++
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
+@@ -235,6 +246,9 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+ #endif
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ xxx_kex = kex;
++#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -404,6 +418,29 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, co
+ pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt);
+ ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ /*
++ * if the user wants to use the none cipher do it
++ * post authentication and only if the right conditions are met
++ * both of the NONE commands must be true and there must be no
++ * tty allocated.
++ */
++ if ((options.none_switch == 1) && (options.none_enabled == 1)) {
++ if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */
++ debug("Requesting none rekeying...");
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
++ kex_prop2buf(xxx_kex->my, myproposal);
++ packet_request_rekeying();
++ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER\n");
++ } else {
++ /* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */
++ debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated");
++ fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+ }
+
+--- a/sshd.c 2016-03-01 04:32:17.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd.c 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -430,8 +430,13 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
+ minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+ }
+
+- xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
++ xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s%s",
+ major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options.hpn_disabled ? "" : SSH_HPN,
++#else
++ "",
++#endif
+ *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+ options.version_addendum, newline);
+
+@@ -1167,6 +1172,10 @@ server_listen(void)
+ int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ int socksize;
++ socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++#endif
+
+ for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+@@ -1207,6 +1216,13 @@ server_listen(void)
+
+ debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize);
++ debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++#endif
++
+ /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+@@ -1706,6 +1722,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ fill_default_server_options(&options);
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
++ char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers;
++
++ xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers);
++ free(old_ciphers);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
+ if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
+ options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+@@ -2136,6 +2161,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* set the HPN options for the child */
++ channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
+ * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
+@@ -2554,6 +2584,12 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
++ debug ("WARNING: None cipher enabled");
++ }
++#endif
++
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ options.kex_algorithms);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+--- a/sshd_config 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config 2016-03-01 04:32:19.000000000 +0100
+@@ -125,6 +125,20 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+
++# the following are HPN related configuration options
++# tcp receive buffer polling. disable in non autotuning kernels
++#TcpRcvBufPoll yes
++
++# disable hpn performance boosts
++#HPNDisabled no
++
++# buffer size for hpn to non-hpn connections
++#HPNBufferSize 2048
++
++
++# allow the use of the none cipher
++#NoneEnabled no
++
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+ # X11Forwarding no
+--- a/version.h 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/version.h 2016-03-01 04:32:20.000000000 +0100
+@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
+
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
+ #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
++#define SSH_HPN "-hpn14v5"
</ins></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfilespampatch"></a>
<div class="modfile"><h4>Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch (146142 => 146143)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch 2016-03-01 03:34:02 UTC (rev 146142)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch 2016-03-01 04:09:39 UTC (rev 146143)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
</span><del>---- a/servconf.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.c 2015-10-24 04:40:13.000000000 +0200
-@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
</del><ins>+--- a/servconf.c 2016-02-26 04:40:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c 2016-02-29 19:48:25.000000000 +0100
+@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
</ins><span class="cx">
</span><span class="cx"> /* Portable-specific options */
</span><span class="cx"> if (options->use_pam == -1)
</span></span></pre></div>
<a id="trunkdportsnetopensshfilespatchsshdcapplesandboxnamedexternaldiff"></a>
<div class="modfile"><h4>Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff (146142 => 146143)</h4>
<pre class="diff"><span>
<span class="info">--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff 2016-03-01 03:34:02 UTC (rev 146142)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff 2016-03-01 04:09:39 UTC (rev 146143)
</span><span class="lines">@@ -1,16 +1,15 @@
</span><del>---- a/sshd.c 2015-08-21 06:49:03.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.c 2015-10-24 20:10:08.000000000 +0200
-@@ -715,11 +715,18 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
</del><ins>+--- a/sshd.c 2016-02-29 19:48:45.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sshd.c 2016-02-29 20:10:32.000000000 +0100
+@@ -713,10 +713,17 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
</ins><span class="cx"> set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
</span><span class="cx">
</span><del>- /* Demote the child */
-+#ifdef __APPLE_SANDBOX_NAMED_EXTERNAL__
</del><ins>++#ifdef __APPLE_SANDBOX_NAMED_EXTERNAL__
</ins><span class="cx"> + /* We need to do this before we chroot() so we can read sshd.sb */
</span><span class="cx"> + if (box != NULL)
</span><span class="cx"> + ssh_sandbox_child(box);
</span><span class="cx"> +#endif
</span><del>- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
- privsep_preauth_child();
</del><ins>+ privsep_preauth_child();
</ins><span class="cx"> setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
</span><span class="cx"> +#ifndef __APPLE_SANDBOX_NAMED_EXTERNAL__
</span><span class="cx"> if (box != NULL)
</span></span></pre>
</div>
</div>
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