Let's avoid using md5 as checksum

Kevin Van Vechten kvv at apple.com
Sat Feb 16 01:20:45 PST 2008


This is really a non-issue.  The intent of the MD5 in the Portfile is  
easily identify when a source archive was corrupted during download,  
or when a 404 file was obtained instead of a source archive.  It's not  
about security, it's about providing a checksum for data -- and to  
that effect MD5 will always be preferable to CRC32.

Few projects are distributed with signatures, and even if they were I  
doubt anyone really audits the code they compile and execute.  If  
you're really concerned about security, you need to invest in a whole  
lot more infrastructure and process than simply changing digest  
algorithms.

- Kevin

On Feb 16, 2008, at 12:11 AM, William Allen Simpson wrote:

> On Feb 16, 2008 2:57 AM, Ryan Schmidt <ryandesign at macports.org> wrote:
>> On Feb 16, 2008, at 01:49, William Allen Simpson wrote:
>>> As long as we ONLY use hashes generated by the distfile author,
>>> located on the distfile site, and NEVER generate our own, we'll be  
>>> fine.
>>
>> But we don't do that. At least, I'm constantly generating my own
>> checksums for my portfiles. The developers of most of my ports do not
>> provide checksums.
>>
> Trust is not transitive.
>
> If you download a file, and generate your own hash, that really  
> defeats
> the whole purpose of tarball verification.  Then, it doesn't matter  
> what
> checksum is used, or its cryptographic strength, as you have no way of
> indicating who generated that hash.


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